The human story in war

Warfare is about human endurance. Politics and politicians/statesmen start wars and decide when to stop them. The civil war was started by politicians and sectional fervor in the South after Lincoln is elected. Had Lincoln lost, the war would not have started in 1860, perhaps it would have waited another decade or more before the sections could no longer stand to treat with one another civilly. If war did not come in 1860, when? Like a divorce that is not healed of its underlying causes, the sectional conflict was inevitable without intervention. Yet, was the war the intervening salve that eventually brought us together? Was war as William T. Sherman and Thomas J. Jackson envisioned, wrote about, and practiced also inevitable?

In his treatise on the Civil War as practiced by both of these men, ? studied how the war turned from targeting armies or territory/capitals to targeting societies and civilians. It was about killing every man, woman, and child who practiced for and gave aid to the underlying ideology that both men fought against. Soldiers were the tools in the hands of the master craftsman; the battles only the medium by which the artists did their work. Both of them a hero to their people. Both men practiced in the military art of moving men on the field of battle, though both not without their faults or their failings. But, when the general is through devising the grand scheme and the men step off in line of battle, it is then just a contest of humanity. Shiloh, with its grand scheme of Johnson's to annihilate Grant or Wallace's tardy entrance the story is of men and their response to pressure and death.

Johnson's plan of attack is almost flawless and Grant's army almost dumb with stupidity, born of the politics of Halleck and his dislike for Grant and Grant's surprising funk on returning to command. The least experienced troops, those cobbled together from garrisons throughout Missouri, Illinois, and Northern Tennessee are moved to Pittsburg Landing first, and like those who are first in an elevator crowd towards the back while the experienced brigades, those who saw battle at Fort Donelson and elsewhere are the last to arrive or are encamped five miles away at Crump's Landing. This is Shakespearean tragedy waiting for the plot to move. The first men to meet the onrush of Johnson's Confederates are green and untested, those of General Prentiss and Sherman. Both men acquit themselves well that day, April 6^th, 1862, but it is the rank and file in the regiments whom the story of Shiloh is built upon. The men who stood in line and fired at their enemy though they are outnumbered by gross numbers.

As Americans we value efforts of grand heroics and the life or death struggle against odds. The landing at Omaha beach, the airborne drops behind German lines in Normandy, the charge of Pickett's and Pettigrew's division at Gettysburg, and the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava; these stories of war and struggle belie our preoccupation and admiration of men at war and the struggle to obey orders where certain death seems the only outcome. Prentiss' division makes a hurried and forlorn stand in front of their camps but they are overrun by superior numbers. Many run, many stand to their colors and die or are captured. The Confederates, too, march and charge into the guns and though they have the surprise and numbers on their side, they press their attacks despite being exhausted by three days of marching and anticipation of the attack. Was it Johnson's determined leadership and planning that bore these regiments and brigades forward or each individual soldier's determination to press onward despite threat of death. Did Grant's presence mean the difference of failure on the first day or was it the determination of his army to not be forced into the Tennessee?

It is clear that the Confederate attack faltered after Johnson's death; his omni-presence on the field of battle, directing his brigades, gave the individual soldier a confidence to press onward, hence the psychological power of a storied leader. Even poor troops can be inspired to feats above their training if they have the confidence to perform. It is also clear that the arrival of Buell's advance division shored up Grant's flagging line as darkness fell on the 6^th, but the Confederate attack had already flagged after the delay caused by Prentiss' division in the Hornet's Nest. The green troops, remnants of the regiments who broke in front of their camps but under the determined leadership of solid officers held until surrounded and buying Grant's army time. This is human drama in war, the sudden turn of events or the quick reversal in the story of the play. The story we have of Shiloh, like all stories where thousands of men take part, will never be fully known and will be even lesser known as time goes by. The Historian looks for these stories now, as those written by Grant, Sherman, Wallace, and other generals have already been tapped. There are thousands of stories written by the participants in letters and diary entries that sit in collections and wait for someone to find them, to fill in another part of the story of Shiloh to completion.

When fiction meets fact

I have a choice that I am struggling with. In my fictional narrative, I have the 6^th Mississippi attacking the 25^th Missouri across a marsh and up a hill. This didn't happen, and yet somehow I put the two together thinking that it had happened, which then seemed to blend well with my storyline, having two characters meet at opposite ends of the firing line. They were to meet later in the story after the battle had ended and it all seemed to fit. Accept that it doesn't fit. This bothers me, as I've striven to portray a truthful rendering of the battle. There are those in the writing community who think that the story is far more important than the historical facts. In a narrative sense, this has some merit. For a novel, the story is what sells the book. A bad story goes nowhere. A good story sells the next novel. It has to be readable and memorable and therein lies where the fiction writer spins their tale using history as the backdrop but taking license where it suits the purpose.

I have taken license where it did not suit my purpose to do so and now I have to decide to correct it or make major changes to the storyline. The average reader will never know, but the historian or the reenactor or civil war buff will know or easily correct the error. I hate when I find inaccuracies in popular media, movies especially. What role does truth play in the writer's art? Some would say that they make their own truth by how they write or weave the story. But, as a historian I'm not so inclined to be cavalier about history or the record and factual events. So, it remains, alter the story to bring things more in line with what did happen or keep the sanctity of the narrative bent to my own will. And, back to the dilemma. How much to change?

In the real battle, the 6^th Mississippi ran up against an Ohio Regiment, the 54^th Ohio who had formed line in front of their camp on the brow of the hill upon which their camp was ensconced. Only the gallant 54^th Ohio in my story is instead the 25^th Missouri. The 25^th did make several stands before being broken on the outskirts of their camp and both resisted the Confederate onslaught bravely if not forlornly. So, some would say, what is the difference in the change in regiment number if the story is compelling? Is it not the story of human beings struggling with one another in combat that is the most important thing? There is another option, correct the error and re-write the sections containing the problem. I don't know if the re-write will take anything out of the story, but it will take changing whole sections to conform to the new narrative. Change the regiment involved and much of the back story must also be changed. Keep the characters in the same regiments but not have them meet under the circumstances already narrated. Or, chalk it up as a problem and hope it does not hurt the reputation of the book or the writer when those who do know point out the issue. One writes for themselves and for the story. The story demands certain things and so does the writer. Yet, History also demands something of me; the truth. The truth to a writer or even a historical fiction writer is oftentimes a nuisance. Or, there is the truth of the story as one envisions it and the truth of events being written about. How one deals with it will mean success of failure in a larger sense.

36th Indiana regiment

Continuing my look at the history of the regiments who played such a role of fiction in my novel, They Met at Shiloh, I take a look today at the 36^th Indiana Volunteers, a three year regiment. Mustered into federal service on the 16^th of September, 1861 under the command of Colonel William Grose, the regiment had what can be termed a fairly typical start in life. Writing 20 years after the war, Grose published an account of the regiment's participation in the war and leaving an account of the regiments and his own career in the western theater.

In my novel, a handful of survivors from the splintered 25^th Missouri attach themselves to the 36^th Indiana and continue the fight at Shiloh. Although this happenstance is fictional, it does to some degree describe the very real occurrence of many men at Shiloh who found themselves dethatched from their regiment and fought on with complete strangers. Civil war companies were extended families, and one can relate to being in the midst of strangers or rivals at sporting events to understand the psychology of feeling strength and courage in the midst of familiarity. It is easy to read about the thousands of fugitives who cowered under the embankment at Pittsburg Landing on the first day of the battle and wonder at the problem officers had in rounding these men up to go and fight. Many were alone or with one or two others that they knew closely and chose to keep to the safety of the river. Strange officers, strange men and no connections to either meant that soldiers did not take to being thrown together with others they did not know or trust to face combat. This is not a phenomenon of past warfare, stories of the ineffectiveness of the scattered D-Day parachute drops in Normandy tell of men fighting amongst strangers lost the finely honed edge they would have had if they were amidst their buddies. So, the men of the 25^th Missouri find themselves added to a company of the 36^th Indiana and with men who have not seen combat of this intensity before.

The 36^th Indiana, after being mustered into service found themselves in Kentucky under the tutelage of brigade commander Jacob Ammen of the 24^th Ohio and assigned to Buell's Army of the Ohio. Assigned to the 10^th Brigade, 4^th Division under General Nelson, the regiment did little but march and move camp until Buell moved on Nashville, Tennessee and the 6^th Ohio and 36^th Indiana being the first federal regiments to enter the city, with the addition of the 24^th Ohio would become common brigade units with one another throughout the rest of the war, seeing common action at Shiloh, Stones River, Chickamauga, and Nashville to name a few. As I have noted in this blog, it was not uncommon for units to be shuffled around and brigade organizations to be created and broken apart depending on the need.

On the 28^th of March, 1862, Buell's army begins to work its way along the Tennessee river to make its juncture with Grant's army at Pittsburg Landing. The 10^th brigade would encamp at Savannah, Tennessee on April 5^th, an easy day's march 8 miles from Grant. It would be here that, on Sunday April 6^th, they would begin their march not knowing that Grant had been attacked. The 10^th Brigade made the march in three hours after receiving orders around 1 pm to make their way parallel to the river and the 36^th Indiana was ferried across by boat, marching up Pittsburg Landing by 4 pm just as the Confederates where making their last attempt to drive Grant into the Tennessee. In Grose' own words:

The Regiment was formed front to the southwest. Grant,
Buell and Nelson were all there between the Regiment and the house, standing in a group. About this time, 4 o'clock, King, of Company G, of Union county, had both legs torn off, and a scout, or some attache of General Grant's command, had his head torn off and fell from his horse dead, close in front of the Regiment. These death scenes caused the men in the line near thereto to curve by a step or two back, but upon hearing the Colonel call out. ' Straighten up that line." it was as promptly done as though the Regiment had been on drill or dress parade. When the Regiment was aligned, General Buell stepped to the Colonel and asked if he was ready, The response being in the affirmative, the General then said, "Do you see that Battery (Captain Stone's) forward of the Regiment about one hundred and fifty yards upon an eminence, firing and falling back by alternate sections:'" "Yes." " Please move forward and sustain it if you can,'' said the General. The order was "Load"; then "Left oblique, march." This was the first time in battle for the 36th. As the Regiment ascended to the left of the Battery, then a little behind the summit, the enemy was advancing up on the other side in two lines. It was intended by the Colonel, at the proper time, as he could see, to give the command. "Fire at will, fire": but as soon as the opposing forces began to see each other they began the firing without command. After three or four rounds the enemy fell back, re-formed and came again. The 36th, in the interval, had time to prepare and be ready, As the enemy advanced the word went along the line, "Boys. fire low." As soon as the enemy was in sight the firing again commenced and after a few well-directed volleys the enemy again fell back. It was then dusk and firing ceased generally for the night. (chapter 3, pg 103-104 Story of the Marches, Battles and Incidents of the 36^th Indiana Regiment by William Grose)

And that was the baptism of fire for this green regiment who played a part in stemming the confederate tide on the first day of battle. This is of course the attack by Confederate Colonel Chalmers brigade of Mississippi regiments as they closed in on the landing, marching parallel to the river and threatening to cut Grant off from the river landing.

The history that can never be known

At the Corinth Civil War Interpretive Center, built on the remains of Battery Robinette – the only remaining earth work of what used to be the defense works occupied by both Confederate and Union infantry before and after Shiloh, there is a bronze relief of Union soldiers maneuvering in line. The image of a soldier running with musket at right shoulder shift reminded me of my reenacting days.

It also got me to thinking. Even as the participants, north and south, entered their waxing years many concluded that the war could never fully be known by those who did not live through it, both civilian and military. Even the memory of the war caused events and facts to meld into gloried fiction or wishful truth. The horror of the war faded into dark memory thankfully forgotten or tucked away deep into sub-conscious. The war was retold in the heroic vein and not in the grotesque as it had been experienced. Meanings were sought to quell the realization that battlefields were mere slaughter pens were men acted brutishly and killed in wanton abandon. Meanings were needed, for the fear that the war was nothing but the expression of decades of hate filled emotion loosed upon one another was too sickening to behold. Yet, they were left with only the memory, as if in slow motion, of what had become. Did the south gain anything by the experience? Did the north? Did anyone? Southern independence was nullified and the strength of the federal government grew. One nation was created from separate states. But the bloodshed was copious and the graveyards filled with diseased corpses.

The historian today cannot grasp what is only left in two dimensions. Reenacting can add a curious third dimension, but only as if vaguely seen in a mirror. Moments, as at the 135h Gettysburg reenactment of Picket's Charge for example, are just momentary glimpses of what might have been. Even in the photographs of the event there is an air of surrealism, they do not capture the widest scope of the eye and the tactile feel of the ground or the July sun. They are two dimensional. Only the memory can conjure them up again in three dimensions and even then only in clips. Trying to describe the event is something akin to trying to describe the war en toto. We can take dead animals and shoot them with mini balls and see the type of destruction can be wrought on flesh and bone. We can do this also with grape and canister. We can take separate parts of the experience and recreate them but we can never fully understand them, even academically. Thousands of us gathered in Pennsylvania in 1998 to commemorate Gettysburg, some say up to 25,000 civilian and military reenactors and there may have been more or less for no one took an accurate count. All of these people, including myself, were after something and I guarantee not all of us found it. We call them magic moments and they come and go at the least expected time. It could be the camaraderie of camp, the morning fog as it blankets a field covered in tents, the battle line being formed under fire, or the standing of sentry duty. Everyone paid to be there and for different reasons.

Like a participant, I am left trying to describe something that others did not participate in. Even those that did find it hard to recollect to one another what it was like. Yet, there is something missing. The dimension is not full and it never will be full. The fear of death. The discharge of musketry and cannonade do not bring death with them on the reenactment field. They only bring sound, hollow booming that carry no projectiles. We can only stand in line and flop down in pretend agony. We do not experience the fear, only the action of fighting. In that, no one who has not experienced war cannot know of it beyond the academic. We read and read voraciously what others have collected in research or read that penned by the survivors of the war and can only see what they saw in this inadequate dimension of fact and word picture.

My own novel, They Met at Shiloh, is an inadequate picture of the battle of Shiloh as I was able to envision it through my characters. Description can cause the mind to graphically put scenes and people together into a whole panorama but it lacks the truthfulness of experience. Only those who were there can truly know Shiloh. Only those who were there can truly know the 135^th of Gettysburg. It came and it went, just like the real battle and it left the participants with scattered images of what they experienced. I remember the camp of the 12^th Connecticut, the unit we fell in with, and the long procession of Confederate brigades tramping down our road prior to the start of the first day of the reenactment battles. The procession went on for over an hour. Jackson's column at Chancellorsville stretched on for about 10 miles along a narrow track and some witnesses attest that it took six hours for the entire column to pass by from start to finish as Jackson made his famous flanking march. I remember standing to as the first day battle unfolded around us, marching through the Confederate camps to get to our starting point while thousands of others started the battle. We stood and watched as other brigades executed their part in the script before we were called to recreate Schimmelpfenning's division arriving late on the first day of battle. We wanted to get into the fight, but thousands upon thousands of the people that we portrayed wanted only for the war to be over, for victory for their side to end the hostilities. They did what they did because it was supposed to happen and not because they wanted to be there.

The civil war fascinates us still because it occurred here. Yet, we are different from the Europeans who would sooner forget that twice there was bloodshed for nothing more than the want of power. Yet even there, WWII reenactor groups gather to "play war" even in the former Soviet Union. There is a strong need to know, and to know more than can be read in a book. The need to experience something of the reasons why. I think that is why I wrote They Met at Shiloh. I needed to experience more than I could through reenacting or reading. I needed to see what it would do to fictional characters who put into life practice what I had learned of the war and of battle, Shiloh in particular. Perhaps it is only in the mind's eye that we can move one step closer to that third dimension of knowledge.

What was Pickett's charge like? Noisy, grandiose, awe inspiring, and hot. We occupied a spot to the left of the "Bloody Angle", next to Lt. Cushing's Battery A, 4^th US light artillery. For an hour we baked under the cloudless sky while the artillery duel took place. Yet, any attempt to describe the emergence of the Confederates from the tree line and their advance across the Hagerstown Pike and into our waiting line would, as Lt. Frank Haskell wrote after the real battle, "would be weak". This photograph is perhaps the closest one can come to seeing some glimpse of what was the reenactment of Pickett's Charge. Yet, it is a "weak" reminder of the real thing, and especially the reason we were there. http://www.gettysburg.com/livinghistory/pastpics/1998/07059809.htm

Petersburg, circa 2008

I was able to visit the Petersburg National Battlefield Park on my recent trip to VA and I was impressed that so much of the earthworks had survived the post war era. Erosion has rounded out the edges of the batteries and trenches, the Crater is visible still and though mostly filled in stands as a testament to the uniqueness of the gambit and as a reminder of the sacrifice of both the USCT regiments and the white volunteer regiments who were slaughtered in the deep hole that trapped them.

Again, Petersburg is a battlefield bereft of monuments or other visual markers save for the grassy mounds of earth that trace the driving tour. Nine months of daily warfare are encapsulated in the now quiet pastureland. Areas of tall grass mark where entrenchments used to exist but were plowed under by post war occupants. Cannon, that obsequious marker to be found on most civil war battlefields mark some areas or actually re-occupy old forts.

One of the few monuments to sit on the field marks the spot where the 1^st Main Heavy Artillery vainly charged Colquitt's Salient early on in the siege and suffered for their obstinacy. The marker, a ways down a walking trail takes one through the second line of entrenchments and rifle pits (when one knows that they existed, every undulation in the ground suddenly heightens the perception that it could have been part of the picket line) takes one from Fort Steadman to a spot perpendicular to the future Union entrenched line on a bee line to the Confederate fort where today sit a few cannon marking Colquitt's Salient. You walk over ground that was bloodied by the men from the 1^st Maine who died or received wounds one for every foot of ground that covered the distance towards the fort they never reached, about 200 yards of open space. The monument lists the names of those who died or died of wounds a few days later and for a battle that saw much death and misery, is a singular testament of the bravery required to charge alone. Markers along the way describe what you are seeing and would have been seeing during the battle or soon after (often with period photographs) and I found that nice, especially since little of the period surroundings survive to this day.

The Fort Steadman/Colquitt's Salient area is one of the few surviving no-man's-land that you can actually walk with a clear view of the opposite line, the forest having re-claimed other areas of the park. You can stand at the apex of Colquitt's and look at the earthworks of Fort Steadman and the intervening ground and try to envision what it would have been like to live day in and day out in the forts or on the picket line. Cannon trace the embrasures of Fort Steadman today. I was struck by how small each fort really was. These surviving earthworks were untouched by man and have sat mute for these tens of decades. The trenches that once held the abitis logs are still visible and indeed offer formidable defense against a frontal attack by a wary and on guard garrison. The trenches still make the fort walls at Steadman eight feet high and one can stand at the parapet and see the guns at Colquitt's easily, the lines being close enough for rifle fire to easily pick off targets. It is also hard to imagine the countryside as it was then. Everything is green and lush today, but from photographs one can see that all was a dirty brown and bark/wood colored: this was what they saw every day. In the book, Mother, May You Never See the Sights I've Seen, a unit history of the 57^th Massachusetts Veteran Volunteers during the last campaign of the war speaks of stints on and off of the line and endless parades and inspections when off the line. These men lived this life through heat of summer and cold of winter, in huts and tents, crowded in trenches or hugging the earth on the picket line and ever mindful of snipers. Standing between the forts in silence, brings to mind the inability to imagine it even after reading so many accounts.

I also ran into a fellow reenactor who was manning a section of line at the base of Battery 9, a trench dug and revited with logs as it would have been during the siege and occupied by two very hot Federals who came out of their shade to talk to anyone who wondered down. http://www.appomattoxtours.com/ We shared some of the same experiences at a few events where his group, the Skulker's Mess and my unit the 23^rd NY, both members of Dom DalBello's Army of the Pacific. It was nice to talk to a fellow hardcore reenactor and someone whose knowledge of the area and battle far surpassed my own (I hadn't time to read up on the battle before visiting, a must for anyone who wants to experience a battlefield). John Marler is his name and someone who has obviously put a lot of himself in allowing others to experience the history of the area.

My main interest in Petersburg was research for a novel/screenplay on the role of the USCT regiments who were there from the beginning of the battle to its end. Writing about history is one thing, and doing it with fiction gives one the freedom to extrapolate on experience, sight and sound, and emotion that is often missed or unavailable when writing non-fiction. But seeing the landscape, its undulations and surroundings gives fodder to the minds eye of a writer. I wanted to see what those USCT regiments saw as they took on Battery 8 and 9 early in the battle.

I do not get the opportunity to wander the battlefields much, living in New Mexico keeps the history that I love out of arms reach. But standing on mute fields is still a treat.

1st and 2nd Manassas battlefields

It has been several weeks since I've been able to add an entry to this blog. I was in Tyson's Corner, VA for a week of training that covered two consecutive weekends (when I normally have time to write) but they were not totally wasted weekends as I was able to finally visit the Manassas battlefield. The First Manassas battlefield park is pristine with a large part of the field preserved as it was after the battle. Many of the houses have been recreated that sit atop key landmarks and a nice walking tour follows the battles progress. Few monuments dot the landscape, however, save for artillery pieces demarking positions of the Washington Artillery and Sykes Batteries opposite them on Henry House Hill. There are little sign posts marking where so-in-so died, but otherwise the field is open, leaving one to imagine the battalions as they arrayed themselves opposite one another.

I was struck by how cleanly the battlefield was preserved and how close the opposing sides were to one another. A field of perhaps 250 yards from the cannon of the Washington Artillery to Sykes batteries with a rolling valley in between, the high ground where death was easily meted out by the cannoneers and one could see that these were small and inexperienced armies who faced one another. I had read many accounts of the battle but was not prepared for the awful grandeur of the layout of the land. These early soldiers stood almost toe to toe, the cannon lines alone would have been enough to deter veteran soldiers from dashing into that deadly valley to charge the opposite line, but charge they did.

What I found unique about First Manassas was the clearly visible size of the field from all points. If you have ever been to Shiloh, or another battlefield you get the idea that thousands upon thousands, tens of thousands of troops were involved and at the point where you might find yourself standing was only a small portion of the whole, a short act in the larger drama. The First Manassas battlefield does not leave you with this feeling of confusion. You can see where most of the action of that day took place save for the crossing of Bull Run and Poplar Ford.

Second Manassas, on the other hand, leaves you with just that feeling of bewilderment. Unfortunately, not much of the action that took place a year later is pristine compared to the area around the Henry House Hill. Here, one has to drive (or walk, but in my case it was getting late and I wanted to see as much as possible before sun down). Signs point to what you would have been looking at had one hundred and sixty years of progress not marred the battlescape. The primary preservation has been done on T.J. Jackson's line in the railroad cut that extends for more than a mile paralleling the Manassas/Sudley road before curving off to the south west. All that is left is a tiny strip of land, overgrown with trees and hemmed in by modern houses of this line that Union General John Pope failed to break. Deer inhabit the railroad cut now. The area of breakthrough, the wide cut in the railroad bed is now gone and at the time of my visit was being cleared of trees for a preservation effort. I remember standing in the fading sunlight wondering what it was I was supposed to be seeing there as we stopped along the tour map.

One can walk the entire length of the remnants of the railroad cut, and in places it is still quite deep. All along this line fighting occurred and deadly fighting for the Federals as their piecemeal attacks probed and sought for a weak point. I did have one mission, however, and that was to make it to the site of the Brawner farm fight between King's brigade and the Stonewall brigade. But, here the field is unkempt and not even a well marked trail was supposed to have existed leading one into the Brawner farm area were the Iron Brigade earned another laurel and the fighting of Second Manassas kicked off. I wanted to stand in the twilight, between the two brigades and see what those men had seen. There is a well groomed field to the left of the Warrenton Turnpike where King's brigade was executing a forced march when they ran into the Confederates. Having read several accounts of this brutal and long fight, was intrigued about the land. As a writer, I've always been interested in how the geography of a place adds to its character. The hill opposite the Brawner farm house is marked where the 1^st US artillery unlimbered to support the Iron Brigade and a feint trail leads down the hill and towards a line of trees that mark the course of Young's Branch. But, on the other side of the little stream it is all tall grass and no trail. I waded through chest high grass to make it to the Confederate line but was unable to continue for very far due to fallen trees and bushes. It was difficult, although easy to see minus the grass where the Confederate line stood some four hundred yards from the railroad cut and the Iron Brigade's line around the Brawner farm buildings. The buildings are gone and but for the unkempt nature of the area I did not find were they had stood. But I did stand, in the twilight, where the two forces stood and traded blows for more than an hour, a feat knowing how outnumbered the Federals were. For one who writes fiction, seeing is believing. It is easy to get the idea when reading modern historical accounts of the battles to get the idea that men fought and marched over flat terrain. The hill where the 1^st US Artillery was situated towers over the Brawner farm field and over the Confederate position opposite. But for the modern trees lining Young's Branch, it is a wonder that King's Brigade was able to stand at all for as long as they did. The Confederate line in the opposite field was also heavily treed during the battle and the fight took place up the slope leading to the Confederate line in front of the Brawner house. You can read about these things, but they make more sense when you stand on the same ground.

It is a pity that, save for this one little section of battlefield, there is not much preserved of the fields. Trees obscure fields of fire and you have to dig back into memory to conjure up what it looked like back then. Few if any post war markers or even cannon mark the Second Manassas fields. Encroachment by both the forest and modernity force you to use your mind's eye to encompass what happened here.

24th Ohio before Shiloh

Reading battle accounts and narratives give us the overall view of how a battle went. Thankfully, the trend has been to give both the general view and that from the ranks. Thanks to collections of letters and memoirs these narratives are rich with detail and anecdote. Reading the after action reports from the Army Official Records of the War of Rebellion give some interesting insight into those in command. The difficulty in choosing an individual unit to write about is that there is not always a lot of information about that unit. I chose the 24th Ohio as one of the units in my novel because it represented an interesting role in the second day of battle and, as I was born in Ohio myself, I wanted to vicariously experience what a possible ancestor of mine might have gone through in volunteering.

Like many regiments from Ohio after they mustered in, the 24th found itself in West Virginia and its first engagement at Cheat Mountain. Like many regiments raised in the early months of the war, the 24th found itself brigaded with many regiments who'd not been in an engagement before. The battle experienced at Cheat Mountain in West Virginia bears some interesting scrutiny.

A search through the correspondence in the official records reveals the importance of the Cheat Mountain pass as both Confederate and Federal messages refer to this pass and its passing of control between the two sides and a controversy in the confederate command about who was to have built fortifications at the pass to hold it. Subsequent to losing the pass, there was an inquiry into the battle and General Garnett's and Colonel Pegram's role in the loss. In a report advanced by Colonel William C. Scott of the 44th Virginia Infantry who was criticized for not coming to Pegram's aid, Scott had been ordered to occupy a defensive position on the Buckhannon road and defend it to the last man. While Scott was following his orders, Pegram was being forced out of his position on the Rich Mountain pass and the whole of the Confederate position commanded by Garnette fell apart. A full description of the campaign can be found here: http://www.sonofthesouth.net/leefoundation/battle-rich-mountain.htm.

The 24th Ohio would meet Scott's Virginians a few days later after the Rich Mountain fight on Cheat Mountain, where again Scott was criticized for not having fortified his position there. Having no entrenching implements and having executed a forced march the night of the Rich Mountain fight, Scott's brigade was in little condition to face the federals.

What is interesting about this early war episode is the number of future generals who participated, namely George B. McLellan, William S. Rosecrans, and John C. Pegram. Mclellan would be promoted upstairs, as it where, to replace the ailing and disfavored hero of the War with Mexico, Winfield Scott. Rosecrans would be promted to Brigadier General and Pegram and would be captured and later paroled. Garnett would die leading his brigade against the federal center at Gettysburg as part of Pickett's division and Pegram would be promoted to Brigadier General and served almost to the end of the war. Pegram held a variety of command and staff positions, commanded a division of Forrest's Cavalry Corps at Chickamauga, an infantry brigade in Early's corps and was wounded at the Battle of the Wilderness and finally killed in 1865 days before the war ended at Hatcher's Run.

In the course of their occupation of the Cheat Mountain pass, the 24th Ohio would face off against another future civil war notable, that of Robert E. Lee, dispatched by Richmond to attempt to recover the lost ground in West Virginia to notable failure. The 24th Ohio would stay on Cheat Mountain until ordered west in November, 1861 to be added to Buell's Army of the Ohio where they then enter into the drama of the battle of Shiloh.

5th Texas Artilery at Shiloh

(inset of Marshall T. Polk)In my novel, I placed a central character in the fictitious unit, the 5th Texas Artillery. Early on in my research I looked for units who participated in key points in the battle. As far as I can determine, the 5th Texas did not participate at Shiloh. In my story, the 5th Texas was amalgamated with a Tennessee battery under Captain Marshall T. Polk, a west point graduate of the class of 1852 and given the task of whipping the Texas volunteers into shape, drawing upon his regular army experience. Though Polk figures only as a minor character in the story, it does allow for delving into a uniquely Confederate habit of referring to its artilery batteries.

Though most state raised units were given a designation based upon the order by which they were raised, the state affiliations of Confederate artillery units are extremely hard to track even in the official records as they are almost always referred to by their commanding officer at the time. So, the Tennesseans who made up "Polk's Battery" are traceable in the records from the time they were raised until the battle of Shiloh, then it becomes harder as Captain Polk, who lost a leg at Shiloh, drops from the record until showing up on a command roster dated May 20th, 1863 as a Lt. Col. in charge of Leonidas Polk's Artillery Corps. What became of his battery is absent from the record, although from the roster there are two Tennessee Artillery units Scott's and Carne's batteries. From the following link, I learned what did become of "Polk's Battery".
http://www.tngenweb.org/civilwar/csaart/polk.html

Although, from other records and reports it is not stated that Capt. Polk was ever captured, he did lose his leg and the battery was disbanded with many of its men being consolidated with Carne's battery after the battle of Shiloh and back in Corinth, Mississippi.

25th Missouri before and after Shiloh

In my soon to be printed novel, They Met at Shiloh, I chose to relate the experiences of the 25thMissouri Volunteers through the eyes of fictional characters who shared a mess. The original 13th Missouri was composed of mostly ethnic Germans and recruiting for the new 25th also included a large Germanic contingent. Studying the history of the 13th/25th revealed a good deal about the practices of paroling prisoners and the consequences of taking an oath to never raise arms against the opposition.

As was stated in the previous post, there were legality questions regarding the agreement entered into by Fremont and Price and the War Department's GO no.29 compelling those who had not been paroled to rejoin their units along with those who had been duly exchanged, officers listed in the following dispatch:

Whereas, Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont, commanding the U.S. forces in Missouri, by letter dated Warsaw, October 21, 1861, authorized Quin Morton, esq., to confer with Maj. Gen. Sterling Price, commanding the Missouri State Guard, in reference to exchange of prisoners; and whereas, General Price has agreed with said Morton upon terms of such exchange as follows, to wit:
First. The exchange shall be effected grade for grade, or two officers of a lower grade as an equivalent in rank for one of a higher grade; the exchange to embrace prisoners on parole as also those held in custody.
Second. The parties released both officers and privates shall be furnished with a certificate of release and of safe conduct to the headquarters of their respective armies or of their division, the officers with their usual side-arms, camp equipage and property and the privates with their personal property.
Third. The prisoners taken by the U.S. forces at Camp Jackson in Saint Louis County on the 10th day of May, 1861, are embraced in this exchange with the express understanding that General Price reiterates the protest(*) of the officers and men then made against the legality of their capture and the exaction of parole when released.
Fourth. Brig. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis or the officer commanding at Benton Barracks in Saint Louis County is hereby authorized and required to issue the certificates above referred to to the officers and privates of the State forces herein named and also to such other officers and non-commissioned officers and privates taken prisoners at Camp Jackson to the number of 530 as may be named to him by Col. David H. Armstrong, Col. Samuel B. Churchill, Col. J. Richard Barrett and D. Robert Barclay, esq., or either of them, and the said Col. David H. Armstrong, Col. Samuel B. Churchill, Col. J. Richard Barrett and D. Robert Barclay, esq., or either of them are hereby authorized and required to issue such certificates to the U.S. officers and privates herein named and also to such other officers, non-commissioned officers and privates taken prisoners at Lexington, Mo., to the number of 530 as may be named to them or either of them by Quin Morton, esq., or such other person as may be named in his place or stead by the commanding officer at Benton Barracks aforesaid.
Fifth. The persons herein named for exchange not connected with the military shall be furnished as hereinbefore provided with certificates of safe conduct to their respective homes:
Now therefore in pursuance of the foregoing stipulations it is hereby agreed by and between Quin Morton, esq., acting for and in behalf of Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont and Maj. Gen. Sterling Price that exchanges be made as follows, to wit:
Brig. Gen. Daniel M. Frost, First Military District, Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Col. 'James A. Mulligan, of the Twenty-third Illinois Volunteers, acting at Lexington as brigadier-general.
Col. John S. Bowen, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Col. Everett Peabody, Thirteenth Regiment Missouri Volunteers.
Maj. R. S. Voorhis, judge-advocate and assistant adjutant-general, First Brigade, Missouri Volunteer Militia, First Military District, for Maj. Charles E. Moore, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Maj. Henry W. Williams, quartermaster, First Brigade, First Military District, Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Maj. Robert T. Van Horn, Kansas City Battalion.
Maj. N. Wall, commissary, First Brigade, First Military District, Missouri Volunteer Militia, and Capt. William C. Buchanan, adjutant, First Regiment, First Military District, Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. Col. James Quirk, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Maj. John J. Anderson, paymaster, First Brigade, First Military District, Missouri Volunteer Militia, and Maj. James R. Shaler, Second Regiment, First Military District, Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Col. Robert White, Fourteenth Regiment Missouri Volunteers.
Maj. Clark Kennerly, Southwest Battalion Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. M. Gleason, and Capt. Robert Adams, of Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Capt. Alex. J.P. Garesché, judge-advocate, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. S. A. Simison, Company D, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Capt. Martin Burke, Company A, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. D. P. Moriarty, Company F, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Capt. Philip Coyne, Company D, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. Charles Coffey, Company H, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Capt. William H. Frazier, Company F, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. James J. Fitzgerald, Company I, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Capt. George W. Wert, Company G, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. Daniel Quirk, Company K, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Capt. George W. Thatcher, Company H, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. F. C. Nichols, Company A, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. B. Newton Hart, Company I, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. Joseph Schmitz, Company B, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. Charles Longueman, Company K, Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. J. W. Robinson, Company C, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. Arthur J. Magenis, quartermaster, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. E. C. Thomas, Company D, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. William B. Hazeltine, Engineer Corps, Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. S.S. Eveans, Company E, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. Hugh A. Garland, Company F, Missouri Volunteer Militia, Second Regiment, for Capt. George B. Hoge, Company F, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. J. T. Shackleford, Company H, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. H. Dill, Company H, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. James George, Company --, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia., for Capt. G. H. Rumbaugh, Company C, of cavalry attached to Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. Overton W. Barret, Company B, Missouri Volunteer Militia, Second Regiment, for Capt. Richard Ridgell, Company [D], Fourteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. Radford, of Radford's battery, for Capt. G. M. Mitchell, First Illinois Cavalry.
First Lieut. E. F. Byrne, Company D, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. James F. Cosgrove, adjutant, Twenty-third Illinois.
First Lieut. Stephen McBride, Company F, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. L. Collins, Company F, Twenty-third Illinois.
First Lieut. John M. Hennessey, Company H, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. T. Hickey, Company H, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
First Lieut. Thomas Keith, Company I, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. James H. Lane, Company K, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
First Lieut. Louis T. Kretschmar, Company K, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. John H. Millar, Company D, Kansas City Battalion.
First Lieut. William H. Finny, Engineer Corps. Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. C. A. Wade, Company C, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
First Lieut. R. B. Clark, Company H, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. W. H. P. Norris, Company D, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
First Lieut. J. M. Douglas, Company C, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, and First Lieut. John Vaughan, of Colonel Elliott's Missouri State Guard, for Capt. F. L. Parker, Company K, of Colonel Eads' regiment.
First Lieut. R. H. Harrington, Company E, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. W. Perkins, Company E, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
First Lieut. P. R. Hutchinson, Company G, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. S. M. Penfield, Company H, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
First Lieut. J. S. Burdett, Company H, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. O. P. Newberry, Company I, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
First Lieut. David Walker, Company I, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. Fred. Klingler, Company C, Kansas City Battalion.
First Lieutenant Miller, Radford's battery, for First Lieut. William S. Marshall, First Illinois Cavalry.
First Lieut. Henry Guibor, Missouri Light Battery, for First Lieut. I. Skillman, First Illinois Cavalry.
Second Lieut. Henry B. Belt, Company A, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. Edward S. Murray, Company B, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Second Lieut. John Henderson, Company F, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. E. P. Trego, Company--, Fourteenth Missouri Volunteers.
Second Lieut. William M. Mooney, Company H, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. Thomas Hogen, Company [D], Fourteenth Missouri.
Second Lieut. Robert Finney, Company I, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. P. J. McDermott, Company A, Twenty-third Illinois.
Second Lieut. A. W. Hopton, Company K, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. P. O'Kane, Company F, Twenty-third Illinois.
Second Lieut. Charles Perrine, Engineer Corps, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieutenant Wallace, Company G, Twenty-third Illinois.
Second Lieut. A. C. Howard, Company C, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. J. B. Hawley, Company F, Thirteenth Missouri.
Second Lieut. Henry Jenkins, Company D, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. Owen Cunningham, Company K, Twenty-third Illinois.
Second Lieut. Alton Long, jr., Company E, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia., for Second Lieut. James E. Hudson, Company D, Twenty-third Illinois.
Second Lieut. Joseph Dean, Company H, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. D. C. S. Kelley, Company G, Twenty-third Illinois.
Second Lieut. -- Morton, Radford's battery, Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. C. W. Graff, Company--, Thirteenth Missouri.
Second Lieut. W. P. Barlow, Missouri Light Battery, for Second Lieut. H. Fette, Fourteenth Missouri.
Second Lieut. Ed. Blennerhassett, Company B, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. P. Higgins, Company C, Twenty-third Illinois.
Third Lieut. James Shields, Company D, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. Edwin Moore, Company C, Sixteenth Missouri.
Third Lieut. John Bullock, Company H, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. George F. Tannant, Company [A], First Illinois Cavalry.
Third Lieut. J. J. Ledue, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. William A. Murray, First Illinois Cavalry.
Third Lieut. John M. Gilkerson, Engineer Corps, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. Albert Rayburn, First Illinois Cavalry.
Third Lieut. J.V. Smith, Company C, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. Morgan Blair, First Illinois Cavalry.
Third Lieut. R. M. Duffy, Company D, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. James B. Dent, First Illinois Cavalry.
Third Lieut. W. C. Potter, Company F, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. John C. Parks, First Illinois Cavalry.
Third Lieut. Andrew J. Hum, Company G, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. S. L. M. Proctor, First Illinois Cavairy.
Third Lieut. D. F. Samuel, Company H, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. Casper Yost, First Illinois Cavalry.
Third Lieut. Charles E. Southard, Company I, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. P. S. Whitaker, attached to Twenty-third Illinois.
Third Lieutenant Ryan, Radford's battery, Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. Neal Bohanan, Fourteenth Missouri.
Third Lieut. ---- McGill, of S. W. Battalion, for Lieut. Charles Rippin, Company E, Fourteenth Missouri.
Private Henry N. Rosser, for Stuart S. Allen, Company K, Twenty-third Illinois.
Private Michael McCarty, for John Gilman, Company C, Twentythird Illinois.
Orderly Sergt. W. A. Davison, Radford's battery, for P. McGinnis, Company I, Twenty-third Illinois.
Sergeant Murphy, of Radford's battery, for S. H. Tourtellotte, Company D, Twenty-third Illinois.
Sergeant Fox, of Radford's battery, for Louis Yates, Company E, Twenty-third Illinois.
Sergeant Ryan, of Radford's battery, for James Quinn, Company A, Twenty-third Illinois.
Capt. Samuel Whiting, of Missouri State Guard, and Capt. William F. Bond, of Missouri State Guard, Adair County, for Lieut. Col. H. M. Day, First Illinois Cavalry.
Capt. H. A. Parmalee, taken at Camp Jackson, for Capt. Henry Erode, Company E, Fourteenth Missouri.
Capt. J. Thomas Whitfield, arrested in Jackson County, for Capt. John McNulta, First Illinois Cavalry.
Captain Caldwell, arrested in Lewis County, for Capt. W. Applegate, Grover's command.
The names of the privates to be exchanged are to be furnished without delay at Saint Louis; those taken at Camp Jackson to Brigadier-General Curtis or the commanding officer at Benton Barracks, and those taken at Lexington to Col. D. H. Armstrong or some other of his associates named in this agreement and the certificates hereinbefore referred to are to be issued according to the lists so furnished without delay.
Should the names of any of the officers or non-commissioned officers taken at Camp Jackson be omitted in the foregoing list and Col. D. H. Armstrong or either of his associates desire their exchange Brigadier-General Curtis or the officer commanding at Benton Barracks will on application make such exchange for any officer or non-commissioned officer captured by the State forces according to rank as hereinbefore stipulated.
This done and agreed to at Neosho, Mo., this 26th day of October, 1861.
QUIN MORTON,
Acting in behalf of and by authority of
Maj. Gen. J. C. Frémont, Commanding U. S. Forces.
STERLING PRICE,
Major-General, Commanding Missouri State Guard.

This "exchange" of prisoners acted upon by Mjr General Fremont was not the first time his actions drew the War Department's ire. Previously, Fremont had also declared that all slaves within the department of the West were to be considered contraband and emancipated. This negotiation between a member of a defunct organization (Missouri Home Guard) and without official Confederate sanction to exchange members of the MHG who were in violation of marshal law for prisoners captured in line of duty rankled many. Price's interest in these MHG members was clear, to continue to build his own forces for the reclaiming of Missouri from Federal control. Fremont, no doubt, saw it as a means to recover his tarnished image of which this stunt only hastened his removal from command.

From the following two dispatches, we learn a little more about the predicament of the men of the old 13th Missouri:

Major-General HALLECK:
It has been reported at this office that certain men in the Thirteenth Missouri Volunteers who were taken prisoners at Lexington and released on parole have been forced into the Twenty-fifth Missouri Volunteers. Some of these men were taken prisoners at Shiloh and bayoneted on the spot; others are said to be liable to similar treatment. Please investigate this matter. Have the paroled men relieved from duty and furloughed until discharged. Call upon their officers for reports.
By order of the Secretary of War:
L. THOMAS,
Adjutant-General.
-----
HDQRS. TWENTY-FIFTH REGIMENT MISSOURI VOLUNTEERS,
In Camp near Corinth, July 18, 1862.
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters Department of the Mississippi, Corinth.
SIR: I have the honor to transmit a list(*) herewith of the non-com-missioned officers and privates of the Twenty-fifth Regiment Missouri Volunteers who were taken prisoners at Lexington with remarks set against their names to show how they stand in regard to exchanges. I have recommended the discharge of some inasmuch as I find they did not intend to re-enter the service after being disbanded by order of General Frémont but felt themselves compelled to do so under the orders of the War Department and of Colonel Peabody. These orders it is understood are considered illegal by the department headquarters and the men are supposed to be entitled to their discharges. It will promote the efficiency of the regiment if the subjects of exchange and discharges can be soon passed upon.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHESTER HARDING, JR.,
Colonel, Commanding Twenty-fifth Missouri Volunteers.

In a later communication (reference beginning of previous post), Col. Harding spells out the circumstances his men dealt with prior to Shiloh and after:

...Many of the men came back for no other reason than that they supposed these orders could and would be enforced against them. In a few instances men were taken from home by actual force and compelled to serve. Of both these classes there were those who had been and those who had not been exchanged. The ranks of the regiment were filled by recruiting and every company had more or less new recruits who then enlisted for the first time as well as more or less of the old regiment. At the battle of Shiloh (as was reported among and believed by the men)some of our wounded were recognized by the enemy as having been paroled and were bayoneted on the spot. This report the officers believe to be untrue but it has created uneasiness in the ranks. Some of the later addressed a memorial to General Halleck upon the subject and also brought the matter before the War Department. I transmit herewith an official copy of a letter of instructions from the Adjutant-General to General Halleck to which I respectfully refer.(*) I also inclose lists(+) as follows: first, names of paroled prisoners unexchanged who claim discharges; second, names of noncommissioned officers and privates who were mustered out, released from parole and afterward unwillingly rejoined in consequence of force or of the orders above referred to and who now claim discharges; third, names of paroled prisoners unexchanged who desire to be exchanged and to continue in service; fourth, names of others who have their exchanges and rejoined voluntarily. These desire a recognition of the validity of the certificates given to the Lexington prisoners--one(++) is inclosed; all the rest are similar to it. I respectfully ask early action in the premises. Discussion of these topics among the men cannot but lower the morale of the regiment, and although no instances of insubordination have as yet occurred I feel that the present condition of things cannot long continue.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHESTER HARDING, JR.,
Colonel Twenty-fifth Missouri Volunteers.

One often reads of green troops in battle and their inexperience in combat to explain the reasons for their breaking under pressure as the 25th Missouri did. Yet, despite the unit's rocky history they stood up to enormous pressure in the early morning hours of April 6th when obviously outnumbered and finally broke after the whole of Prentiss' line was flanked at their camps. Though the reports of men being bayoneted was false as stated by Col. Harding, it is clear that many of its men were under compulsion.

Saga of the 13th Missouri Vols

HDQRS. TWENTY-FIFTH REGIMENT MISSOURI VOLUNTEERS,
In Camp near Corinth, July 24, 1862.

Maj. J. A. RAWLINS, Asst. Adjt. Gen., District of West Tennessee.
SIR: I have the honor to address you for the purpose of calling the attention of the commanding general to the condition of the Twenty-fifth Regiment Missouri Volunteers in the command of which I have been since the 4th instant. September 20, 1861, the regiment was surrendered at Lexington, Mo., and in a short time thereafter was released upon parole. In October General Frémont then in command of the department ordered it to be disbanded and the men to be mustered out of service. The order was carried into effect October 26, 1861. Afterward an arrangement was made by Generals Frémont and Price whereby the Camp Jackson prisoners on parole were to be exchanged as far as their numbers reached for an equal number of Lexington prisoners. Under this arrangement a part of the officers and men of this regiment (then known as the Thirteenth Missouri Volunteers) received their release from parole but many still remained under their obligation. In February, 1862, the War Department issued a special order (No. 29) by which the muster-out was cancelled and the officers and men were required to report to regimental headquarters for duty. Col. Everett Peabody who then commanded the regiment thereupon published his order to the effect that those who failed to report would be treated as deserters.

Regimental histories of civil war units are often just as intriguing as reading about the battles in which they took part. As I was working on They Met at Shiloh, I puzzled over why I could not find much information in the Official Records for the 25th Missouri previous to the battle of Shiloh. It was only after having written my drafts and in editing that I discovered that the 25th hadn't participated in the Ft. Donelson campaign as I had previously supposed. While other regiments were freezing in the siege lines around Ft. Donelson, another drama was playing out.

Days after the defeat at Wilson's Creek and scattering of Nathaniel Lyon's federal forces in Missouri, Major General Sterling Price, in command of the Missouri Home Guard - forces sympathetic to the Confederacy and nominally counted as part of the rebellion but nonetheless representative of a neutral state marched triumphantly through Springfield Missouri unopposed on September 11th, 1861 and his van stopped on the outskirts of Lexington, Missouri for the night to await the arrival of the rest of Price's force.


Major General Nathaniel Lyon
The confederate force that overwhelmed Lyon at Wilson's Creek was smaller as it progressed into Missouri as the Arkansas troops under General Ben McColluch leaving Price with a substantial force. Facing them were several thousand determined yet hopelessly out gunned federals under Colonel James Mulligan in command of a brigade (the 23rd Illinois Infantry) of Irish, Mulligan himself Irish, marched from Jefferson City, Missouri, and once determining where Price was headed entered Lexington and began preparing for its defense. Here he was joined by a regiment of Illinois Cavalry (1st Illinois) and several hundred home guard. Colonel Everett Peabody, marching from Kansas City, Missouri, brought in his 13th Missouri Volunteers to add to the defense of this strategic and important city. 2,800 men to oppose Price's 10,000. The results were inevitable.

Colonel James A. Mulligan, cmdr 23rd Ill
Though Mulligan gave Price a few days pause and bought enough time to allow Major General Fremont to cobble together sufficient force to oppose Price, the 2,800 men minus those lost during the three days of fighting were surrendered on September 20th, 1861. It would be here that the drama would begin for the hapless members of the 13th Missouri and 1st Illinois Volunteers. Public outrage over the twin defeats of Wilson's Creek and of Lexington would see Fremont cashiered and Henry W. Halleck taking command of the Western Theater of operations. But, before Fremont left, he brokered an exchange of prisoners as alluded to in the above communication.
Mjr General Sterling Price
The problem with the negotiations for prisoner exchange was that Price held no Confederate commission and was not legally holding those captured at Lexington prisoner and Fremont, for his part, was holding men captured at Camp Jackson, Missouri Home Guard units encamped in St. Louis and prepared to take the federal arsenal were not legally prisoners of war but arrested. Due to the anomalies official Washington did not take a kindly view of the exchanges. Those men taken at Lexington were paroled on the field after taking an oath to not take up arms against the Confederacy unless duly paroled and to these men it was a serious oath taken and given in honor. Further, due to the paroles and oaths taken by these regiments General Fremont ordered they be disbanded and discharged from duty until properly paroled. So, men of the 13th Missouri headed for home and were not expecting to re-enter the service. The following extract from the Official Records aptly demonstrates how these oaths were taken:

Mjr General John C. Fremont

BENTON BARRACKS, April 5, 1862.
Major-General HALLECK.
RESPECTED SIR: We the undersigned respectfully solicit your attention for a few moments in regard to this article concerning the First Illinois Cavalry Volunteers, we having been compelled to come back into the service and that too under false pretenses; and we ask why all the members of the above regiment are not compelled to return if any part of them are? We do respect the oath which circumstances compelled us to take when we were taken prisoners at Lexington and there surrendered our arms to General Price of the Confederate Army. We there took a solemn oath before God and man that we would not take up arms against the Southern Confederacy. We consider it our duty to stand by that oath and if we do take up arms again we will have to answer for a sin which we are compelled to commit, and moreover we do not think that an exchange will relieve us from that oath. We cannot think that oath null and void; we would be happy to think so but we do not. The officers of this regiment can return to the service with a clear conscience as they did not take an oath but were released on parole of honor and have been exchanged. We wish to do what is right and we will do that come what will. We hope to hear from you soon.
BENJAMIN F. BROWN,
President.
M. B. SMITH,
Secretary of Meeting

What compelled these men to rejoin their regiments was General Order no. 29 canceling the discharges and, in some instances, forcing the men at point of the bayonet into rejoining their regiments. In the case of the old 13th Missouri, not all of the men had been exchanged in the Price/Fremont exchange and therefore still remained under their oaths. The GO no. 29 forced all men mustered into federal service back into their units regardless of the circumstances as evidenced in the above entry. Hence, while these men were being rounded up and reporting for duty in February, 1862 the battle for Fort Donelson was being fought and won. By March and April, the 25th Missouri, reconstituted from the cadre of the old 13th and mostly new recruits, was encamped with other green regiments of Prentiss's division awaiting their date with destiny.


Mjr General Bengamin Prentiss

Camp of the 25th Missouri Volunteers, Union at Shiloh

In my novel, They Met at Shiloh, Robert and his pards find themselves standing at the edge of the Hamburg – Purdy road staring downhill at the gathering mass of Confederates preparing to march upon them. A steep slope of about 75 yards leads up to the camps of Peabody's brigade and the memorial to Colonel Everett Peabody surrounded now by trees and young forest. The 25^th's camp site was their last stand before the regiment disintegrated and scattered along with the rest of Peabody's brigade.

Early on the morning of April 6^th Peabody cobbled together a battalion of companies from his brigade for a recon force taking them through thick woods to the outskirts of Fraley Field where in the early morning light they beheld the divisions of Leonidas Polk's Corps marching towards them. Outnumbered and alone, the battalion stood at the edge of the Fraley farm and the forest and opened fire, holding the confederates at bay for a brief time, hoping to buy time for the rest of the army to prepare.

Counter marching a quarter of a mile they again formed in the field of the Seay farm where more companies of the brigade met them and another short, sharp fight ensued until their flanks were turned and they again counter marched to their camp sites atop the rise where Peabody was later killed.

Much has been made of the federal commands lack of preparations and defenses prior to the attack and of the disdain displayed by key commanders as to any hint of a threat. Peabody, censured for his constant cry of "wolf" is notable for the prescient early morning patrols he'd been sending out towards Michie's Crossroads. Although unaware of the eminent avalanche descending upon his companies, Peabody did not believe the scoffing of his superiors. Having bumped into Polk's advancing lines; the recon patrol forced a delay in the advance. The 25^th Missouri, after a brief stand at the outskirts of their camp, retreated through it and tried to stand on the other side until outflanked.

Wallace and Grant at Shiloh

I'll end this series on General Wallace by recapping what I have found in my research and give a conclusion that, to me, seems obvious. Wallace, in command of the 3^rd Division encamped at Crump's Landing and only in command due to the ailing Smith, brought his division into the fight at Shiloh late. Unable to participate in the fighting on the first day, he along with Buell's Army of the Ohio, provided Grant with fresh regiments to carry the fight to the enemy on the second day of fighting. These are facts that are not disputed. The reasoning behind the delay and who may have caused that delay are very important. Further, the reports of Grant's staff officers as entered into the official record also speak volumes, but not necessarily as intended by their authors. One need only look at what was written about Grant after the war and who was doing that writing to see the connection to those reports and the intended damage done to Lew Wallace's reputation and career. That the written order to Wallace was lost that day and only recounted from memory by suspect people is also a fact. No written order, no conclusive proof that Grant did or did not order Wallace to take the river road and end up on the extreme right of the army instead of on the left as Wallace maintains in opposition to the word of Grant and Rowley and Baxter.

What we have left is the decision of history and historians to the available evidence and a good gut feeling guess as to what is true and what is not. The memoirs of Grant and the biography by Badau are highly suspect in their accounting of the truth, and such material should always be looked at with a wary eye. Further, the official reports by Baxter and Rowley should also be taken with a wary eye including that of Wallace himself. These are not documents that speak to events as they happened but events as seen and portrayed by the vanity and reputations of their authors. That Wallace sought to downplay his difficulties in getting to the field by up-playing his accomplishments on the second day can be accepted as putting a good face on a bad situation. His delay was an embarrassment, both for himself and for the army and that may lead to further inquiry as to the reports of McPherson, Rowley, and Baxter in the official record to screen Grant from any possible mistake he might have made in judgment. That a mistake was made is obvious, but by who?

From the testimony, both after the war and in the official records, it is clear that the words and tone of both Baxter and Rowley in the official record are tainted and false. That Wallace could have gotten lost in an area he would have known well by that time is preposterous. That he was slow is another matter and up for interpretation. By accounts of his subordinates, both shortly after the battle and after the war attest to the rigorous march the division had to execute on April 6^th and the poor quality of the River Road that they ultimately had to traverse to arrive at Pittsburg Landing. That they also executed a forced march of some tens of miles due to the countermarch is also clear, adding time to their arrival. Rowley and Baxter paint a picture of incompetence on Wallace and heroism to themselves, especially Rowley.

What is often overlooked is Grant's mental and physical state at the time of the battle, something that would have come into play upon him during those momentous events. As W.E. Woodward stresses in his biography, Grant was still smarting from his rebuke by his superior Halleck and from his fall a few days before. It is not hard to imagine, given Grant's spotty command history to this point that he misjudged the weight of the Confederate forces bearing upon him and the problems his own divisions were having in containing the assault. It is not hard, further, to imagine that he did indeed order Wallace to join with Sherman's left by the Purdy Road where his forces could best be employed where the crises was most acute. However, knowing the state of the roads connecting the two camps Grant should have known that Wallace's division was at least several hours from entering the fight. His impatience at Wallace's tardiness is further murk to cloud the evidence as he expected Wallace to arrive sooner than either the Purdy Road route or the River Road route would have allowed. Wallace was neither the rank armature nor tactical genius, by all accounts he was competent to do his duty and proved such at the battle of Monocacy later in the war, leading one to the conclusion that he was neither the hero or the goat of Shiloh.

The conclusion to draw from all of this is that Wallace was the victim of the circumstances of where he was at the time of the battle and a mistake made by Grant, in either word or inference, to cause the order to be worded and written down to communicate to Wallace Grant's intentions for the 3^rd Division. That something was communicated to Wallace that lead him, either by direct order or by inference, to join the left of Sherman's division is also clear despite the official testimony of Grant's staff. Wallace was talked out of an official court of inquiry by Sherman and others, an act that would probably have exonerated him and done damage to Grant, especially given his shaky relationship with Halleck. If true, in some senses, Wallace may have been the needed scapegoat that allowed Grant to eventually lead the Union to victory later in the war.

24th Ohio at Shiloh, Army of the Ohio

Along a narrow and lonely path stand the monuments representing Amman's brigade in their positions before they attacked the line thrown together by General Cleburne atop the hill cut by the Hamburg-Purdy road. The forest has been allowed to grow over this part of the battlefield and it gives the whole area an enclosed feeling, claustrophobic and on this day in particular, damp from a recent downpour. The 24^th Ohio, part of Buell's Army of the Ohio, stepped lively across an undulating terrain to charge into the maw of artillery and Confederate musketry to push Cleburne's line even further to the rear.

The character Philip, from my novel They Met at Shiloh, stood in a brigade line that stretched three hundred yards long, marked today by a trail cut in the trees with monument after monument marking the approximate middle of each regimental line. It is sad to see these monuments being over grown by the forest, no longer facing the enemy but now facing loneliness. I only happened upon the trail by accident while searching around the Bloody Pond area, a small marker, across the Hamburg-Savannah road, marks the extreme right of Ammen's brigade line, whose flank most regiment would have been a stones throw away from the Bloody Pond to witness the misery of its denizens. Down the trail I ran into regiment after regiment of Ammen's line until finally finding the monument I was looking for. I wanted to see where each regiment from my novel stood and what the ground looked like.

Of all of the civil war battlefields Shiloh is the one I've been to the most, having visited when I was very young with vague impressions of it still lingering after 25 years, then again at the soggy 135^th reenactment, and finally last summer to get landmark and geographic impressions for the novel. Shiloh is not like Gettysburg, where the field is much like it was 145 years ago where one can stand atop Missionary Ridge or Cemetery Ridge and look out at the same rolling countryside that the combatants did. Shiloh has been allowed to over grow parts of the battlefield forcing you to rely upon the descriptions of the combatants themselves to understand what it was like. Many areas now are thickly wooded and though some of the fields are still present, like Seay and Fraley Field are preserved, some of the other avenues are impassable. Chickamauga, another thickly wooded area is probably better preserved as far as forest management goes. One can take the descriptions of the fight at the Viniard Farm and imagine standing at the tree line along with the soldiers of Wilder's brigade and look down into the famed ditch or from Winfrey Field and see the treeline where the Confederates attacked at dusk.

The Shiloh of yesteryear was forested, but southern farming techniques and general occupation of the land meant that the tree cover was sparse and the farmers only cleared areas for planting, leaving the periphery open for trees to grow unmolested. The results were just like any forest area butting up against settlement, old and tall trees and undergrowth that was minimal due to grazing. It is a pity that the campsites and some of the interior fields of the battleground are now mere clearings in the trees, leaving little to the imagination as to how it looked then. Thankfully, we can still walk those grounds and stand where fallen patriots stood and read the markers that attempt to describe a mere fraction of what happened in each spot. There is a power to those fields yet, of ringing cheers and acrid gun powder whose voice is fading away with time and memory. You can feel you are a part of it for a moment in the stillness and lean upon a gun line marked by surplus cannon. This is what is experienced at Ruggle's gun line facing the Sunken Road. You see it from the campsite of the 25^th Missouri Vols who met the onrush of Confederates early on the morning of April 6^th. You hear it in the groans of the wounded crowded around the Bloody Pond. You feel it in the fear struck crowds of fugitives under the bluff at Pittsuburg Landing.

Lew Wallace and his defenders

When reading either the official records of the war or the correspondences sent to Grant by Wallace from his former subordinates at the time of Shiloh, one thing becomes clear. Both men and their surrogates were trying to preserve a reputation. Grant had those involved submit official reports to the War Department regarding their actions in the Wallace affair as has already been noted. Wallace admits that the fateful order, the order delivered by Assistant Quarter Master Baxter without signature, has been lost to history, reconstructed from the memory by he and his defenders.

The reports submitted by Grant's staff officers, submitted days after the battle all state that the orders Grant communicated to Wallace were to march by the river road and join the right of the army at Pittsburg Landing. Further, most paint an unflattering picture of Wallace in his attempt to get his division into the fight. Rowley, Grant's right hand according to W. E. Woodward's Meet General Grant was particularly unflattering in his description of Wallace and his state of mind.

How can these statements be reconciled with the remembrances of Wallace's staff officers who encountered both Baxter and Rowley as they executed their errands? Wallace's own aid de camp, a Captain Ross relates in a letter to Wallace penned in 1868 that not only was the order given verbally to him as he encountered Captain Baxter but also the written order shown to him relating Grant's order to "move forward and join General Sherman's right on the Purdy road" forming his line of battle at right angles with the river. He further states that the shortest route to accomplish this was to take the Purdy road to make a junction with the right of Sherman, a distance of about 5 miles versus the route purported to have been given via the River Road, a distance of about 12 miles. The order was not signed but was inferred to have come from Grant given that it was delivered by a staff officer of the commanding general. Ross also relates that Baxter told him, upon inquiry as to how the battle was going, that the enemy was being driven in at every point. At the point that Rowley overtook Wallace's command with Grant's second order to hurry along and the intelligence that Sherman had been pushed back so that to continue on the current course would have been to march onto the field behind the enemy lines unsupported, the distance to counter march and take the River Road was no less than 12 miles total. Rowley's account states that Wallace's division marched as if under no idea of haste or need for speed, a statement countered by Col. Thayer's AG, a Major Strickland of the 15^th Ohio who relates that the brigades made a rapid march then counter march.

One man is lying. One man is either mistaken in recollection or purposeful in deceit as to the true nature of the incident. A now missing order, conflicting statements given by staff officers who have every reason to defend their benefactor and discredit their antagonist, and a host of years gone by with no living eye witness the mystery of why Wallace's division was absent on that first day will never be resolved with any certainty.

Grant, before Shiloh

By late February, 1862 General Grant was a newly minted Major General without a command. In a foreshadowing of what would happen along the banks of the Tennessee river in April, Grant's tiny command of 27,000 investing Fort Donelson was surprised in an early morning breakout attempt by the bottled up Confederates. Through the incompetence of the Confederate command, the wildly successful smashing of McLernand's division of which the brunt of the attack fell upon, Confederate General Floyd who decided to turn and try to route the next division in line instead of moving his charges down the now open road to Nashville. The brunt of this attack fell upon General Lew Wallace's 3^rd Division.

W.E. Woodward's biography of Grant states that Grant was called by Flag Officer Foote's flagship for a conference owing to being then unable to get about easily due to a wound. This happenstance took Grant away from the scene of the sudden attack by the Confederates, an unfortunate coincidence that would have consequences later. The early morning parley with Foote brings a most uncomfortable consequence for Grant. His visit is hard to account for how much time he spent and why he did not hear the battle raging no more than three miles away on his right. That he did not hear it is attested by other witnesses on board Foote's flagship. What has been questioned is how much time he spent there. The other being why was he not informed of the attack right away. Grant's own staff should have known where he was, but Grant's detractors later said he spent half the day lounging in Foote's state room smoking cigars and drinking. Woodward states that this rumor was indefensible given Foote's high degree of prohibition against any intoxicant on any vessel of his command. Still, the time is unaccounted for and in his official report of the action Wallace states that he did not see Grant until well after 3pm once the Confederate attack upon his division had been stopped.

In the world of military politics and with a commanding officer, Major General Henry W. Halleck, establishing a severe dislike of the ramshackle Grant, it is not too hard to imagine that Wallace's report, which Grant would have eventually seen, did not paint his participation in the battle in too favorable of a light. That Grant did reverse the morning's misfortune notwithstanding, a cloud was hanging over his generalship. If he cast blame upon Wallace is not known, but it was entered into the official record of the battle and Grant himself makes mention of his whereabouts that morning in his own official account of the action but fails to clarify how long he was in conference with Foote. Aside from reports from Lt. Col McPherson, the army's chief engineer, Flag Officer Foote, and General McLernand, Wallace's report is the only one that makes mention of Grant's presence at all on the battlefield.

With the surrender of Fort Donelson on the 16^th, Grant falls afoul of Halleck when he takes a trip to Nashville to confer with Buell whose entrance into the Tennessee state capital crowned an extraordinarily bad month for the Confederacy. Halleck, fed up with his upstart general and feeling somewhat threatened by his sudden rise to national acclaim fires off several complaints to General McClellan, in command at this time of all the military forces for the Union, requesting permission to relieve Grant of command for his unauthorized absence. Short of arresting Grant, Halleck does the next best thing, leaving him dawdling about Donelson with nothing to do and no troops to command. For two weeks Halleck leaves him there to stew until giving him orders to rejoin his command on the banks of the Tennessee at Pittsburg Landing and Crump's Landing. Once there, Grant remains in a funk until the battle.

Woodward's biography draws comparisons from the Grant that we know and love who eventually rose to the highest rank in the US military, a post once held by Washington, and the Grant who commanded the Army of the Tennessee in April, 1862 and states that Grant is off of his game. Establishing his command post eight miles downriver at Savannah and shuttling back and forth every day, Grant does not stay on the field with his army and remains quasi out of touch with the dispositions that General Smith, given command of the army in place of Grant by Halleck, made of the army. A further fall from a horse a few days before the battle leaves him in constant pain and unable to ride a horse for very long. His own statements notwithstanding as to why he tarried in Savannah as long as he did, Grant's behavior during this episode is out of character and suspect. It is easy, then to speculate and imagine that the mystery of the unwritten order to Wallace at Crump's Landing was indeed to join the right flank of Sherman's division and not, as the second order later in the day was, to march by the river road to Pittsburg Landing. Speculation only, as no court of inquiry was convened that would have opened up much more evidence in either support or condemnation of Wallace officially.

He said, he said

General Lew Wallace

General Wallace was faced with a problem. 6 miles as the crow flies from the scene of the morning's surprise attack on Grant's army encamped at Pittsburg Landing and following orders that he states changed their tune mid way through his march.

I've puzzled over this for some time. If the orders that Grant was supposed to have sent to Wallace via Captain Baxter had been logged and, as dictated by Grant, entered into that log, would not the controversy over why Wallace took the Purdy road instead of the more direct road to Pittsburg Landing be over?

In his article, as alluded to in prior posts, General Henry Carrington surmises that due to Grant's swollen and injured ankle, he was more reliant upon his staff officers to send and note his orders given his lack of mobility. In this instance, a verbal order by Grant to Baxter that was written in Baxter's own hand and then delivered to Wallace later that morning. Carrington further surmises that Baxter, given Grant's orders to have Wallace close up with his right, knowing that at this time in the morning the full details of the fight being still foggy, wrote down the order so as to interpret what Grant wanted, i.e. Wallace on the right of the line next to Sherman instead of at Pittsburg Landing.

Wallace further relates in his letter to Grant years later (also alluded to in previous post) that Baxter first verbally then by written order communicated success of Union arms on the right necessitating the need for Wallace to close on Sherman's right flank via a march down the Purdy road. He states:

…Perhaps I should here state that this order was not signed by anyone, but coming as it did through one of the Staff Officers of the Commanding General, could not be questioned. I would also state in this connection, that when I met Captain Baxter first, I asked him how things were going. He replied that Grant was driving the enemy at all points.

We know this to not be the case, as the left of Grant's line, the division of Prentiss was in fact crumbling and only redeemed by a quick consolidation at the sunken road by remnants of Prentiss', WHL Wallace, and Hurlbut's commands. If Baxter really did relate these things, it shows how in the dark Grant and or Baxter really was at that hour, approximately 8 am when Grant dispatched the captain to Wallace. In his official report, Wallace stated thusly:

At 11.30 o'clock the anticipated order arrived, directing me to come up and take position on the right of the army and form my line of battle at a right angle with the river. As it also directed me to leave a force to prevent surprise at Crump's Landing, the Fifty-sixth Ohio and Sixty-eighth Ohio Regiments were detached for that purpose, with one gun from Lieutenant Thurber's battery. Selecting a road that led directly to the right of the lines as they were established around Pittsburg Landing on Sunday morning, my column started immediately, the distance being about 6 miles. The cannonading, distinctly audible, quickened the steps of the men. Snake Creek, difficult of passage at all times, on account of its steep banks and swampy bottoms, ran between me and the point of junction. Short way from it Captain Rowley, from General Grant, and attached to his staff, overtook me. From him I learned that our lines had been beaten back; that the right, to which I was proceeding, was then fighting close to the river, and that the road pursued would take me in the enemy's rear, where, in the unfortunate condition of the battle, my command was in danger of being entirely cut off. It seemed, on his representation, most prudent to carry the column across to what is called the "River road," which, following the windings of the Tennessee bottoms, crossed Snake Creek by a good bridge close to Pittsburg Landing. This movement occasioned a counter-march, which delayed my junction with the main army until a little after night-fall. The information brought me by Captain Rowley was confirmed by Colonel McPherson and Captain Rawlins, also of the general's staff, who came up while I was crossing to the River road. About 1 o'clock at night my brigades and batteries were disposed, forming the extreme right, and ready for battle.

Something must be said, at this point, about battle reports. Each commanding officer was required to give an account of himself to his superior upon any occasion. Indeed, much of the Official Records of the War of Rebellion are full of mundane reports of actions taken or events witnessed. Herein lies a problem. These reports, written after the fact, were occasion for an officer to trump up his own deeds and belittle the deeds of others. We see this in Captain Rowley's report in my last post. Rowley wastes little time in making him to be the hero and Wallace the goat. It is also clear from Wallace's own report that he had little intimation that he was going to be made a scapegoat for the failure of the first day's action.