He said, he said

General Lew Wallace

General Wallace was faced with a problem. 6 miles as the crow flies from the scene of the morning's surprise attack on Grant's army encamped at Pittsburg Landing and following orders that he states changed their tune mid way through his march.

I've puzzled over this for some time. If the orders that Grant was supposed to have sent to Wallace via Captain Baxter had been logged and, as dictated by Grant, entered into that log, would not the controversy over why Wallace took the Purdy road instead of the more direct road to Pittsburg Landing be over?

In his article, as alluded to in prior posts, General Henry Carrington surmises that due to Grant's swollen and injured ankle, he was more reliant upon his staff officers to send and note his orders given his lack of mobility. In this instance, a verbal order by Grant to Baxter that was written in Baxter's own hand and then delivered to Wallace later that morning. Carrington further surmises that Baxter, given Grant's orders to have Wallace close up with his right, knowing that at this time in the morning the full details of the fight being still foggy, wrote down the order so as to interpret what Grant wanted, i.e. Wallace on the right of the line next to Sherman instead of at Pittsburg Landing.

Wallace further relates in his letter to Grant years later (also alluded to in previous post) that Baxter first verbally then by written order communicated success of Union arms on the right necessitating the need for Wallace to close on Sherman's right flank via a march down the Purdy road. He states:

…Perhaps I should here state that this order was not signed by anyone, but coming as it did through one of the Staff Officers of the Commanding General, could not be questioned. I would also state in this connection, that when I met Captain Baxter first, I asked him how things were going. He replied that Grant was driving the enemy at all points.

We know this to not be the case, as the left of Grant's line, the division of Prentiss was in fact crumbling and only redeemed by a quick consolidation at the sunken road by remnants of Prentiss', WHL Wallace, and Hurlbut's commands. If Baxter really did relate these things, it shows how in the dark Grant and or Baxter really was at that hour, approximately 8 am when Grant dispatched the captain to Wallace. In his official report, Wallace stated thusly:

At 11.30 o'clock the anticipated order arrived, directing me to come up and take position on the right of the army and form my line of battle at a right angle with the river. As it also directed me to leave a force to prevent surprise at Crump's Landing, the Fifty-sixth Ohio and Sixty-eighth Ohio Regiments were detached for that purpose, with one gun from Lieutenant Thurber's battery. Selecting a road that led directly to the right of the lines as they were established around Pittsburg Landing on Sunday morning, my column started immediately, the distance being about 6 miles. The cannonading, distinctly audible, quickened the steps of the men. Snake Creek, difficult of passage at all times, on account of its steep banks and swampy bottoms, ran between me and the point of junction. Short way from it Captain Rowley, from General Grant, and attached to his staff, overtook me. From him I learned that our lines had been beaten back; that the right, to which I was proceeding, was then fighting close to the river, and that the road pursued would take me in the enemy's rear, where, in the unfortunate condition of the battle, my command was in danger of being entirely cut off. It seemed, on his representation, most prudent to carry the column across to what is called the "River road," which, following the windings of the Tennessee bottoms, crossed Snake Creek by a good bridge close to Pittsburg Landing. This movement occasioned a counter-march, which delayed my junction with the main army until a little after night-fall. The information brought me by Captain Rowley was confirmed by Colonel McPherson and Captain Rawlins, also of the general's staff, who came up while I was crossing to the River road. About 1 o'clock at night my brigades and batteries were disposed, forming the extreme right, and ready for battle.

Something must be said, at this point, about battle reports. Each commanding officer was required to give an account of himself to his superior upon any occasion. Indeed, much of the Official Records of the War of Rebellion are full of mundane reports of actions taken or events witnessed. Herein lies a problem. These reports, written after the fact, were occasion for an officer to trump up his own deeds and belittle the deeds of others. We see this in Captain Rowley's report in my last post. Rowley wastes little time in making him to be the hero and Wallace the goat. It is also clear from Wallace's own report that he had little intimation that he was going to be made a scapegoat for the failure of the first day's action.