What is the evidence?

General Lew Wallace, finding himself at the helm of Smith's division in the middle of the conflagration that would become Shiloh, was in the unenviable post of being separated from the rest of the army at Crump's Landing, six miles as the crow files from Pittsburg Landing. Swampy, forested, and cut by a poor circuit of dirt roads made communication overland time consuming. Early fears of the loss of either of the convenient places to land supplies within reach of any move upon Corinth, Mississippi lead to the dispatching of Smith's 6^th Division to three camps around Crump's Landing. In Grant's memoirs, he states he was initially fearful that the confederates might make a move to take Crump's Landing overland and therefore, especially as he wrestled with the object of the confederate attack. He states this as his reason for having Wallace hold his division in readiness to move until he had developed the enemy's intentions.

Grant knew the road network leading to Crump's overland was indirect and communications over it lengthy. Grant's visit to Wallace at Crump's occurred at 8 am, his order to Wallace to move didn't arrive until 11 am over this lousy road network. Three hours was in the balance for Grant, it would take that long for any communication to get to Wallace and take longer for Wallace to get his division to where it was being ordered. In a battle, a moment is too late even when communications are instantaneous. Communications at Shiloh and in any battle of the Civil War was by horse and any communication of orders would have to take into account that whatever goal Grant had in mind for Wallace, it would have to be with the foreknowledge that the battle situation would be different by the time Wallace's division made the field. Was Grant's intention to tuck the 6^th division away at the landing because the course of the battle was unpredictable or, like any field commander, made a judgment based upon the information he had at the time?

In Grant's official report, he states that due to the circuitous route Wallace needed to take, it took him until evening to arrive on the field. It isn't clear if Grant held any ill will towards Wallace regarding his divisions tardiness, but he at least did not communicate any ill feelings in his official report.

Captain John A. Rawlins, an aid de camp of Grant, states that Grant dispatched Captain Baxter to order Wallace from Crump's Landing to move to the right of the line. However, he further states that Wallace refused to comply without a written order and that Grant then dispatched Rawlins with orders for Wallace to march by the river road, crossing snake creek and the bridge over it and end up at the Landing on the right of the line. Rawlins encounters Wallace along the Purdy road and not the River road as he expected and communicated Grant's orders to Wallace who "indignantly" refuted refusing an order written or not. Rawlins further states that Wallace expressed ignorance of the river road and lamely stated that he was on the road his cavalry headed down. He further communicated to Rawlins that as neither he nor anyone on his staff knew of the river road, he would need Rawlins to act as guide.

I find it incredible that Wallace would not have known about this road, having been encamped at Crump's for weeks and in communication with the rest of the army this whole time. Rawlins' statement regarding this seems overly to the point of feeding the idea that Wallace was in a state of poor command. But, the source must be considered here, coming from a close confidant and ardent supporter of Grant throughout the war and his aid de camp, a position given to ones close friends and supporters. More on this in further posts.