Wallace and Grant at Shiloh

I'll end this series on General Wallace by recapping what I have found in my research and give a conclusion that, to me, seems obvious. Wallace, in command of the 3^rd Division encamped at Crump's Landing and only in command due to the ailing Smith, brought his division into the fight at Shiloh late. Unable to participate in the fighting on the first day, he along with Buell's Army of the Ohio, provided Grant with fresh regiments to carry the fight to the enemy on the second day of fighting. These are facts that are not disputed. The reasoning behind the delay and who may have caused that delay are very important. Further, the reports of Grant's staff officers as entered into the official record also speak volumes, but not necessarily as intended by their authors. One need only look at what was written about Grant after the war and who was doing that writing to see the connection to those reports and the intended damage done to Lew Wallace's reputation and career. That the written order to Wallace was lost that day and only recounted from memory by suspect people is also a fact. No written order, no conclusive proof that Grant did or did not order Wallace to take the river road and end up on the extreme right of the army instead of on the left as Wallace maintains in opposition to the word of Grant and Rowley and Baxter.

What we have left is the decision of history and historians to the available evidence and a good gut feeling guess as to what is true and what is not. The memoirs of Grant and the biography by Badau are highly suspect in their accounting of the truth, and such material should always be looked at with a wary eye. Further, the official reports by Baxter and Rowley should also be taken with a wary eye including that of Wallace himself. These are not documents that speak to events as they happened but events as seen and portrayed by the vanity and reputations of their authors. That Wallace sought to downplay his difficulties in getting to the field by up-playing his accomplishments on the second day can be accepted as putting a good face on a bad situation. His delay was an embarrassment, both for himself and for the army and that may lead to further inquiry as to the reports of McPherson, Rowley, and Baxter in the official record to screen Grant from any possible mistake he might have made in judgment. That a mistake was made is obvious, but by who?

From the testimony, both after the war and in the official records, it is clear that the words and tone of both Baxter and Rowley in the official record are tainted and false. That Wallace could have gotten lost in an area he would have known well by that time is preposterous. That he was slow is another matter and up for interpretation. By accounts of his subordinates, both shortly after the battle and after the war attest to the rigorous march the division had to execute on April 6^th and the poor quality of the River Road that they ultimately had to traverse to arrive at Pittsburg Landing. That they also executed a forced march of some tens of miles due to the countermarch is also clear, adding time to their arrival. Rowley and Baxter paint a picture of incompetence on Wallace and heroism to themselves, especially Rowley.

What is often overlooked is Grant's mental and physical state at the time of the battle, something that would have come into play upon him during those momentous events. As W.E. Woodward stresses in his biography, Grant was still smarting from his rebuke by his superior Halleck and from his fall a few days before. It is not hard to imagine, given Grant's spotty command history to this point that he misjudged the weight of the Confederate forces bearing upon him and the problems his own divisions were having in containing the assault. It is not hard, further, to imagine that he did indeed order Wallace to join with Sherman's left by the Purdy Road where his forces could best be employed where the crises was most acute. However, knowing the state of the roads connecting the two camps Grant should have known that Wallace's division was at least several hours from entering the fight. His impatience at Wallace's tardiness is further murk to cloud the evidence as he expected Wallace to arrive sooner than either the Purdy Road route or the River Road route would have allowed. Wallace was neither the rank armature nor tactical genius, by all accounts he was competent to do his duty and proved such at the battle of Monocacy later in the war, leading one to the conclusion that he was neither the hero or the goat of Shiloh.

The conclusion to draw from all of this is that Wallace was the victim of the circumstances of where he was at the time of the battle and a mistake made by Grant, in either word or inference, to cause the order to be worded and written down to communicate to Wallace Grant's intentions for the 3^rd Division. That something was communicated to Wallace that lead him, either by direct order or by inference, to join the left of Sherman's division is also clear despite the official testimony of Grant's staff. Wallace was talked out of an official court of inquiry by Sherman and others, an act that would probably have exonerated him and done damage to Grant, especially given his shaky relationship with Halleck. If true, in some senses, Wallace may have been the needed scapegoat that allowed Grant to eventually lead the Union to victory later in the war.