5th Texas Artilery at Shiloh

(inset of Marshall T. Polk)In my novel, I placed a central character in the fictitious unit, the 5th Texas Artillery. Early on in my research I looked for units who participated in key points in the battle. As far as I can determine, the 5th Texas did not participate at Shiloh. In my story, the 5th Texas was amalgamated with a Tennessee battery under Captain Marshall T. Polk, a west point graduate of the class of 1852 and given the task of whipping the Texas volunteers into shape, drawing upon his regular army experience. Though Polk figures only as a minor character in the story, it does allow for delving into a uniquely Confederate habit of referring to its artilery batteries.

Though most state raised units were given a designation based upon the order by which they were raised, the state affiliations of Confederate artillery units are extremely hard to track even in the official records as they are almost always referred to by their commanding officer at the time. So, the Tennesseans who made up "Polk's Battery" are traceable in the records from the time they were raised until the battle of Shiloh, then it becomes harder as Captain Polk, who lost a leg at Shiloh, drops from the record until showing up on a command roster dated May 20th, 1863 as a Lt. Col. in charge of Leonidas Polk's Artillery Corps. What became of his battery is absent from the record, although from the roster there are two Tennessee Artillery units Scott's and Carne's batteries. From the following link, I learned what did become of "Polk's Battery".
http://www.tngenweb.org/civilwar/csaart/polk.html

Although, from other records and reports it is not stated that Capt. Polk was ever captured, he did lose his leg and the battery was disbanded with many of its men being consolidated with Carne's battery after the battle of Shiloh and back in Corinth, Mississippi.

25th Missouri before and after Shiloh

In my soon to be printed novel, They Met at Shiloh, I chose to relate the experiences of the 25thMissouri Volunteers through the eyes of fictional characters who shared a mess. The original 13th Missouri was composed of mostly ethnic Germans and recruiting for the new 25th also included a large Germanic contingent. Studying the history of the 13th/25th revealed a good deal about the practices of paroling prisoners and the consequences of taking an oath to never raise arms against the opposition.

As was stated in the previous post, there were legality questions regarding the agreement entered into by Fremont and Price and the War Department's GO no.29 compelling those who had not been paroled to rejoin their units along with those who had been duly exchanged, officers listed in the following dispatch:

Whereas, Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont, commanding the U.S. forces in Missouri, by letter dated Warsaw, October 21, 1861, authorized Quin Morton, esq., to confer with Maj. Gen. Sterling Price, commanding the Missouri State Guard, in reference to exchange of prisoners; and whereas, General Price has agreed with said Morton upon terms of such exchange as follows, to wit:
First. The exchange shall be effected grade for grade, or two officers of a lower grade as an equivalent in rank for one of a higher grade; the exchange to embrace prisoners on parole as also those held in custody.
Second. The parties released both officers and privates shall be furnished with a certificate of release and of safe conduct to the headquarters of their respective armies or of their division, the officers with their usual side-arms, camp equipage and property and the privates with their personal property.
Third. The prisoners taken by the U.S. forces at Camp Jackson in Saint Louis County on the 10th day of May, 1861, are embraced in this exchange with the express understanding that General Price reiterates the protest(*) of the officers and men then made against the legality of their capture and the exaction of parole when released.
Fourth. Brig. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis or the officer commanding at Benton Barracks in Saint Louis County is hereby authorized and required to issue the certificates above referred to to the officers and privates of the State forces herein named and also to such other officers and non-commissioned officers and privates taken prisoners at Camp Jackson to the number of 530 as may be named to him by Col. David H. Armstrong, Col. Samuel B. Churchill, Col. J. Richard Barrett and D. Robert Barclay, esq., or either of them, and the said Col. David H. Armstrong, Col. Samuel B. Churchill, Col. J. Richard Barrett and D. Robert Barclay, esq., or either of them are hereby authorized and required to issue such certificates to the U.S. officers and privates herein named and also to such other officers, non-commissioned officers and privates taken prisoners at Lexington, Mo., to the number of 530 as may be named to them or either of them by Quin Morton, esq., or such other person as may be named in his place or stead by the commanding officer at Benton Barracks aforesaid.
Fifth. The persons herein named for exchange not connected with the military shall be furnished as hereinbefore provided with certificates of safe conduct to their respective homes:
Now therefore in pursuance of the foregoing stipulations it is hereby agreed by and between Quin Morton, esq., acting for and in behalf of Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont and Maj. Gen. Sterling Price that exchanges be made as follows, to wit:
Brig. Gen. Daniel M. Frost, First Military District, Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Col. 'James A. Mulligan, of the Twenty-third Illinois Volunteers, acting at Lexington as brigadier-general.
Col. John S. Bowen, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Col. Everett Peabody, Thirteenth Regiment Missouri Volunteers.
Maj. R. S. Voorhis, judge-advocate and assistant adjutant-general, First Brigade, Missouri Volunteer Militia, First Military District, for Maj. Charles E. Moore, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Maj. Henry W. Williams, quartermaster, First Brigade, First Military District, Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Maj. Robert T. Van Horn, Kansas City Battalion.
Maj. N. Wall, commissary, First Brigade, First Military District, Missouri Volunteer Militia, and Capt. William C. Buchanan, adjutant, First Regiment, First Military District, Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. Col. James Quirk, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Maj. John J. Anderson, paymaster, First Brigade, First Military District, Missouri Volunteer Militia, and Maj. James R. Shaler, Second Regiment, First Military District, Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Col. Robert White, Fourteenth Regiment Missouri Volunteers.
Maj. Clark Kennerly, Southwest Battalion Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. M. Gleason, and Capt. Robert Adams, of Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Capt. Alex. J.P. Garesché, judge-advocate, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. S. A. Simison, Company D, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Capt. Martin Burke, Company A, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. D. P. Moriarty, Company F, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Capt. Philip Coyne, Company D, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. Charles Coffey, Company H, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Capt. William H. Frazier, Company F, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. James J. Fitzgerald, Company I, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Capt. George W. Wert, Company G, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. Daniel Quirk, Company K, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Capt. George W. Thatcher, Company H, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. F. C. Nichols, Company A, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. B. Newton Hart, Company I, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. Joseph Schmitz, Company B, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. Charles Longueman, Company K, Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. J. W. Robinson, Company C, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. Arthur J. Magenis, quartermaster, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. E. C. Thomas, Company D, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. William B. Hazeltine, Engineer Corps, Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. S.S. Eveans, Company E, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. Hugh A. Garland, Company F, Missouri Volunteer Militia, Second Regiment, for Capt. George B. Hoge, Company F, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. J. T. Shackleford, Company H, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Capt. H. Dill, Company H, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. James George, Company --, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia., for Capt. G. H. Rumbaugh, Company C, of cavalry attached to Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. Overton W. Barret, Company B, Missouri Volunteer Militia, Second Regiment, for Capt. Richard Ridgell, Company [D], Fourteenth Missouri Regiment.
Capt. Radford, of Radford's battery, for Capt. G. M. Mitchell, First Illinois Cavalry.
First Lieut. E. F. Byrne, Company D, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. James F. Cosgrove, adjutant, Twenty-third Illinois.
First Lieut. Stephen McBride, Company F, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. L. Collins, Company F, Twenty-third Illinois.
First Lieut. John M. Hennessey, Company H, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. T. Hickey, Company H, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
First Lieut. Thomas Keith, Company I, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. James H. Lane, Company K, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
First Lieut. Louis T. Kretschmar, Company K, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. John H. Millar, Company D, Kansas City Battalion.
First Lieut. William H. Finny, Engineer Corps. Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. C. A. Wade, Company C, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
First Lieut. R. B. Clark, Company H, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. W. H. P. Norris, Company D, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
First Lieut. J. M. Douglas, Company C, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, and First Lieut. John Vaughan, of Colonel Elliott's Missouri State Guard, for Capt. F. L. Parker, Company K, of Colonel Eads' regiment.
First Lieut. R. H. Harrington, Company E, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. W. Perkins, Company E, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
First Lieut. P. R. Hutchinson, Company G, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. S. M. Penfield, Company H, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
First Lieut. J. S. Burdett, Company H, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. O. P. Newberry, Company I, Thirteenth Missouri Regiment.
First Lieut. David Walker, Company I, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for First Lieut. Fred. Klingler, Company C, Kansas City Battalion.
First Lieutenant Miller, Radford's battery, for First Lieut. William S. Marshall, First Illinois Cavalry.
First Lieut. Henry Guibor, Missouri Light Battery, for First Lieut. I. Skillman, First Illinois Cavalry.
Second Lieut. Henry B. Belt, Company A, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. Edward S. Murray, Company B, Twenty-third Illinois Regiment.
Second Lieut. John Henderson, Company F, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. E. P. Trego, Company--, Fourteenth Missouri Volunteers.
Second Lieut. William M. Mooney, Company H, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. Thomas Hogen, Company [D], Fourteenth Missouri.
Second Lieut. Robert Finney, Company I, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. P. J. McDermott, Company A, Twenty-third Illinois.
Second Lieut. A. W. Hopton, Company K, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. P. O'Kane, Company F, Twenty-third Illinois.
Second Lieut. Charles Perrine, Engineer Corps, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieutenant Wallace, Company G, Twenty-third Illinois.
Second Lieut. A. C. Howard, Company C, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. J. B. Hawley, Company F, Thirteenth Missouri.
Second Lieut. Henry Jenkins, Company D, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. Owen Cunningham, Company K, Twenty-third Illinois.
Second Lieut. Alton Long, jr., Company E, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia., for Second Lieut. James E. Hudson, Company D, Twenty-third Illinois.
Second Lieut. Joseph Dean, Company H, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. D. C. S. Kelley, Company G, Twenty-third Illinois.
Second Lieut. -- Morton, Radford's battery, Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. C. W. Graff, Company--, Thirteenth Missouri.
Second Lieut. W. P. Barlow, Missouri Light Battery, for Second Lieut. H. Fette, Fourteenth Missouri.
Second Lieut. Ed. Blennerhassett, Company B, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Second Lieut. P. Higgins, Company C, Twenty-third Illinois.
Third Lieut. James Shields, Company D, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. Edwin Moore, Company C, Sixteenth Missouri.
Third Lieut. John Bullock, Company H, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. George F. Tannant, Company [A], First Illinois Cavalry.
Third Lieut. J. J. Ledue, First Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. William A. Murray, First Illinois Cavalry.
Third Lieut. John M. Gilkerson, Engineer Corps, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. Albert Rayburn, First Illinois Cavalry.
Third Lieut. J.V. Smith, Company C, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. Morgan Blair, First Illinois Cavalry.
Third Lieut. R. M. Duffy, Company D, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. James B. Dent, First Illinois Cavalry.
Third Lieut. W. C. Potter, Company F, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. John C. Parks, First Illinois Cavalry.
Third Lieut. Andrew J. Hum, Company G, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. S. L. M. Proctor, First Illinois Cavairy.
Third Lieut. D. F. Samuel, Company H, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. Casper Yost, First Illinois Cavalry.
Third Lieut. Charles E. Southard, Company I, Second Regiment Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. P. S. Whitaker, attached to Twenty-third Illinois.
Third Lieutenant Ryan, Radford's battery, Missouri Volunteer Militia, for Lieut. Neal Bohanan, Fourteenth Missouri.
Third Lieut. ---- McGill, of S. W. Battalion, for Lieut. Charles Rippin, Company E, Fourteenth Missouri.
Private Henry N. Rosser, for Stuart S. Allen, Company K, Twenty-third Illinois.
Private Michael McCarty, for John Gilman, Company C, Twentythird Illinois.
Orderly Sergt. W. A. Davison, Radford's battery, for P. McGinnis, Company I, Twenty-third Illinois.
Sergeant Murphy, of Radford's battery, for S. H. Tourtellotte, Company D, Twenty-third Illinois.
Sergeant Fox, of Radford's battery, for Louis Yates, Company E, Twenty-third Illinois.
Sergeant Ryan, of Radford's battery, for James Quinn, Company A, Twenty-third Illinois.
Capt. Samuel Whiting, of Missouri State Guard, and Capt. William F. Bond, of Missouri State Guard, Adair County, for Lieut. Col. H. M. Day, First Illinois Cavalry.
Capt. H. A. Parmalee, taken at Camp Jackson, for Capt. Henry Erode, Company E, Fourteenth Missouri.
Capt. J. Thomas Whitfield, arrested in Jackson County, for Capt. John McNulta, First Illinois Cavalry.
Captain Caldwell, arrested in Lewis County, for Capt. W. Applegate, Grover's command.
The names of the privates to be exchanged are to be furnished without delay at Saint Louis; those taken at Camp Jackson to Brigadier-General Curtis or the commanding officer at Benton Barracks, and those taken at Lexington to Col. D. H. Armstrong or some other of his associates named in this agreement and the certificates hereinbefore referred to are to be issued according to the lists so furnished without delay.
Should the names of any of the officers or non-commissioned officers taken at Camp Jackson be omitted in the foregoing list and Col. D. H. Armstrong or either of his associates desire their exchange Brigadier-General Curtis or the officer commanding at Benton Barracks will on application make such exchange for any officer or non-commissioned officer captured by the State forces according to rank as hereinbefore stipulated.
This done and agreed to at Neosho, Mo., this 26th day of October, 1861.
QUIN MORTON,
Acting in behalf of and by authority of
Maj. Gen. J. C. Frémont, Commanding U. S. Forces.
STERLING PRICE,
Major-General, Commanding Missouri State Guard.

This "exchange" of prisoners acted upon by Mjr General Fremont was not the first time his actions drew the War Department's ire. Previously, Fremont had also declared that all slaves within the department of the West were to be considered contraband and emancipated. This negotiation between a member of a defunct organization (Missouri Home Guard) and without official Confederate sanction to exchange members of the MHG who were in violation of marshal law for prisoners captured in line of duty rankled many. Price's interest in these MHG members was clear, to continue to build his own forces for the reclaiming of Missouri from Federal control. Fremont, no doubt, saw it as a means to recover his tarnished image of which this stunt only hastened his removal from command.

From the following two dispatches, we learn a little more about the predicament of the men of the old 13th Missouri:

Major-General HALLECK:
It has been reported at this office that certain men in the Thirteenth Missouri Volunteers who were taken prisoners at Lexington and released on parole have been forced into the Twenty-fifth Missouri Volunteers. Some of these men were taken prisoners at Shiloh and bayoneted on the spot; others are said to be liable to similar treatment. Please investigate this matter. Have the paroled men relieved from duty and furloughed until discharged. Call upon their officers for reports.
By order of the Secretary of War:
L. THOMAS,
Adjutant-General.
-----
HDQRS. TWENTY-FIFTH REGIMENT MISSOURI VOLUNTEERS,
In Camp near Corinth, July 18, 1862.
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters Department of the Mississippi, Corinth.
SIR: I have the honor to transmit a list(*) herewith of the non-com-missioned officers and privates of the Twenty-fifth Regiment Missouri Volunteers who were taken prisoners at Lexington with remarks set against their names to show how they stand in regard to exchanges. I have recommended the discharge of some inasmuch as I find they did not intend to re-enter the service after being disbanded by order of General Frémont but felt themselves compelled to do so under the orders of the War Department and of Colonel Peabody. These orders it is understood are considered illegal by the department headquarters and the men are supposed to be entitled to their discharges. It will promote the efficiency of the regiment if the subjects of exchange and discharges can be soon passed upon.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHESTER HARDING, JR.,
Colonel, Commanding Twenty-fifth Missouri Volunteers.

In a later communication (reference beginning of previous post), Col. Harding spells out the circumstances his men dealt with prior to Shiloh and after:

...Many of the men came back for no other reason than that they supposed these orders could and would be enforced against them. In a few instances men were taken from home by actual force and compelled to serve. Of both these classes there were those who had been and those who had not been exchanged. The ranks of the regiment were filled by recruiting and every company had more or less new recruits who then enlisted for the first time as well as more or less of the old regiment. At the battle of Shiloh (as was reported among and believed by the men)some of our wounded were recognized by the enemy as having been paroled and were bayoneted on the spot. This report the officers believe to be untrue but it has created uneasiness in the ranks. Some of the later addressed a memorial to General Halleck upon the subject and also brought the matter before the War Department. I transmit herewith an official copy of a letter of instructions from the Adjutant-General to General Halleck to which I respectfully refer.(*) I also inclose lists(+) as follows: first, names of paroled prisoners unexchanged who claim discharges; second, names of noncommissioned officers and privates who were mustered out, released from parole and afterward unwillingly rejoined in consequence of force or of the orders above referred to and who now claim discharges; third, names of paroled prisoners unexchanged who desire to be exchanged and to continue in service; fourth, names of others who have their exchanges and rejoined voluntarily. These desire a recognition of the validity of the certificates given to the Lexington prisoners--one(++) is inclosed; all the rest are similar to it. I respectfully ask early action in the premises. Discussion of these topics among the men cannot but lower the morale of the regiment, and although no instances of insubordination have as yet occurred I feel that the present condition of things cannot long continue.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHESTER HARDING, JR.,
Colonel Twenty-fifth Missouri Volunteers.

One often reads of green troops in battle and their inexperience in combat to explain the reasons for their breaking under pressure as the 25th Missouri did. Yet, despite the unit's rocky history they stood up to enormous pressure in the early morning hours of April 6th when obviously outnumbered and finally broke after the whole of Prentiss' line was flanked at their camps. Though the reports of men being bayoneted was false as stated by Col. Harding, it is clear that many of its men were under compulsion.

Saga of the 13th Missouri Vols

HDQRS. TWENTY-FIFTH REGIMENT MISSOURI VOLUNTEERS,
In Camp near Corinth, July 24, 1862.

Maj. J. A. RAWLINS, Asst. Adjt. Gen., District of West Tennessee.
SIR: I have the honor to address you for the purpose of calling the attention of the commanding general to the condition of the Twenty-fifth Regiment Missouri Volunteers in the command of which I have been since the 4th instant. September 20, 1861, the regiment was surrendered at Lexington, Mo., and in a short time thereafter was released upon parole. In October General Frémont then in command of the department ordered it to be disbanded and the men to be mustered out of service. The order was carried into effect October 26, 1861. Afterward an arrangement was made by Generals Frémont and Price whereby the Camp Jackson prisoners on parole were to be exchanged as far as their numbers reached for an equal number of Lexington prisoners. Under this arrangement a part of the officers and men of this regiment (then known as the Thirteenth Missouri Volunteers) received their release from parole but many still remained under their obligation. In February, 1862, the War Department issued a special order (No. 29) by which the muster-out was cancelled and the officers and men were required to report to regimental headquarters for duty. Col. Everett Peabody who then commanded the regiment thereupon published his order to the effect that those who failed to report would be treated as deserters.

Regimental histories of civil war units are often just as intriguing as reading about the battles in which they took part. As I was working on They Met at Shiloh, I puzzled over why I could not find much information in the Official Records for the 25th Missouri previous to the battle of Shiloh. It was only after having written my drafts and in editing that I discovered that the 25th hadn't participated in the Ft. Donelson campaign as I had previously supposed. While other regiments were freezing in the siege lines around Ft. Donelson, another drama was playing out.

Days after the defeat at Wilson's Creek and scattering of Nathaniel Lyon's federal forces in Missouri, Major General Sterling Price, in command of the Missouri Home Guard - forces sympathetic to the Confederacy and nominally counted as part of the rebellion but nonetheless representative of a neutral state marched triumphantly through Springfield Missouri unopposed on September 11th, 1861 and his van stopped on the outskirts of Lexington, Missouri for the night to await the arrival of the rest of Price's force.


Major General Nathaniel Lyon
The confederate force that overwhelmed Lyon at Wilson's Creek was smaller as it progressed into Missouri as the Arkansas troops under General Ben McColluch leaving Price with a substantial force. Facing them were several thousand determined yet hopelessly out gunned federals under Colonel James Mulligan in command of a brigade (the 23rd Illinois Infantry) of Irish, Mulligan himself Irish, marched from Jefferson City, Missouri, and once determining where Price was headed entered Lexington and began preparing for its defense. Here he was joined by a regiment of Illinois Cavalry (1st Illinois) and several hundred home guard. Colonel Everett Peabody, marching from Kansas City, Missouri, brought in his 13th Missouri Volunteers to add to the defense of this strategic and important city. 2,800 men to oppose Price's 10,000. The results were inevitable.

Colonel James A. Mulligan, cmdr 23rd Ill
Though Mulligan gave Price a few days pause and bought enough time to allow Major General Fremont to cobble together sufficient force to oppose Price, the 2,800 men minus those lost during the three days of fighting were surrendered on September 20th, 1861. It would be here that the drama would begin for the hapless members of the 13th Missouri and 1st Illinois Volunteers. Public outrage over the twin defeats of Wilson's Creek and of Lexington would see Fremont cashiered and Henry W. Halleck taking command of the Western Theater of operations. But, before Fremont left, he brokered an exchange of prisoners as alluded to in the above communication.
Mjr General Sterling Price
The problem with the negotiations for prisoner exchange was that Price held no Confederate commission and was not legally holding those captured at Lexington prisoner and Fremont, for his part, was holding men captured at Camp Jackson, Missouri Home Guard units encamped in St. Louis and prepared to take the federal arsenal were not legally prisoners of war but arrested. Due to the anomalies official Washington did not take a kindly view of the exchanges. Those men taken at Lexington were paroled on the field after taking an oath to not take up arms against the Confederacy unless duly paroled and to these men it was a serious oath taken and given in honor. Further, due to the paroles and oaths taken by these regiments General Fremont ordered they be disbanded and discharged from duty until properly paroled. So, men of the 13th Missouri headed for home and were not expecting to re-enter the service. The following extract from the Official Records aptly demonstrates how these oaths were taken:

Mjr General John C. Fremont

BENTON BARRACKS, April 5, 1862.
Major-General HALLECK.
RESPECTED SIR: We the undersigned respectfully solicit your attention for a few moments in regard to this article concerning the First Illinois Cavalry Volunteers, we having been compelled to come back into the service and that too under false pretenses; and we ask why all the members of the above regiment are not compelled to return if any part of them are? We do respect the oath which circumstances compelled us to take when we were taken prisoners at Lexington and there surrendered our arms to General Price of the Confederate Army. We there took a solemn oath before God and man that we would not take up arms against the Southern Confederacy. We consider it our duty to stand by that oath and if we do take up arms again we will have to answer for a sin which we are compelled to commit, and moreover we do not think that an exchange will relieve us from that oath. We cannot think that oath null and void; we would be happy to think so but we do not. The officers of this regiment can return to the service with a clear conscience as they did not take an oath but were released on parole of honor and have been exchanged. We wish to do what is right and we will do that come what will. We hope to hear from you soon.
BENJAMIN F. BROWN,
President.
M. B. SMITH,
Secretary of Meeting

What compelled these men to rejoin their regiments was General Order no. 29 canceling the discharges and, in some instances, forcing the men at point of the bayonet into rejoining their regiments. In the case of the old 13th Missouri, not all of the men had been exchanged in the Price/Fremont exchange and therefore still remained under their oaths. The GO no. 29 forced all men mustered into federal service back into their units regardless of the circumstances as evidenced in the above entry. Hence, while these men were being rounded up and reporting for duty in February, 1862 the battle for Fort Donelson was being fought and won. By March and April, the 25th Missouri, reconstituted from the cadre of the old 13th and mostly new recruits, was encamped with other green regiments of Prentiss's division awaiting their date with destiny.


Mjr General Bengamin Prentiss

Camp of the 25th Missouri Volunteers, Union at Shiloh

In my novel, They Met at Shiloh, Robert and his pards find themselves standing at the edge of the Hamburg – Purdy road staring downhill at the gathering mass of Confederates preparing to march upon them. A steep slope of about 75 yards leads up to the camps of Peabody's brigade and the memorial to Colonel Everett Peabody surrounded now by trees and young forest. The 25^th's camp site was their last stand before the regiment disintegrated and scattered along with the rest of Peabody's brigade.

Early on the morning of April 6^th Peabody cobbled together a battalion of companies from his brigade for a recon force taking them through thick woods to the outskirts of Fraley Field where in the early morning light they beheld the divisions of Leonidas Polk's Corps marching towards them. Outnumbered and alone, the battalion stood at the edge of the Fraley farm and the forest and opened fire, holding the confederates at bay for a brief time, hoping to buy time for the rest of the army to prepare.

Counter marching a quarter of a mile they again formed in the field of the Seay farm where more companies of the brigade met them and another short, sharp fight ensued until their flanks were turned and they again counter marched to their camp sites atop the rise where Peabody was later killed.

Much has been made of the federal commands lack of preparations and defenses prior to the attack and of the disdain displayed by key commanders as to any hint of a threat. Peabody, censured for his constant cry of "wolf" is notable for the prescient early morning patrols he'd been sending out towards Michie's Crossroads. Although unaware of the eminent avalanche descending upon his companies, Peabody did not believe the scoffing of his superiors. Having bumped into Polk's advancing lines; the recon patrol forced a delay in the advance. The 25^th Missouri, after a brief stand at the outskirts of their camp, retreated through it and tried to stand on the other side until outflanked.

Wallace and Grant at Shiloh

I'll end this series on General Wallace by recapping what I have found in my research and give a conclusion that, to me, seems obvious. Wallace, in command of the 3^rd Division encamped at Crump's Landing and only in command due to the ailing Smith, brought his division into the fight at Shiloh late. Unable to participate in the fighting on the first day, he along with Buell's Army of the Ohio, provided Grant with fresh regiments to carry the fight to the enemy on the second day of fighting. These are facts that are not disputed. The reasoning behind the delay and who may have caused that delay are very important. Further, the reports of Grant's staff officers as entered into the official record also speak volumes, but not necessarily as intended by their authors. One need only look at what was written about Grant after the war and who was doing that writing to see the connection to those reports and the intended damage done to Lew Wallace's reputation and career. That the written order to Wallace was lost that day and only recounted from memory by suspect people is also a fact. No written order, no conclusive proof that Grant did or did not order Wallace to take the river road and end up on the extreme right of the army instead of on the left as Wallace maintains in opposition to the word of Grant and Rowley and Baxter.

What we have left is the decision of history and historians to the available evidence and a good gut feeling guess as to what is true and what is not. The memoirs of Grant and the biography by Badau are highly suspect in their accounting of the truth, and such material should always be looked at with a wary eye. Further, the official reports by Baxter and Rowley should also be taken with a wary eye including that of Wallace himself. These are not documents that speak to events as they happened but events as seen and portrayed by the vanity and reputations of their authors. That Wallace sought to downplay his difficulties in getting to the field by up-playing his accomplishments on the second day can be accepted as putting a good face on a bad situation. His delay was an embarrassment, both for himself and for the army and that may lead to further inquiry as to the reports of McPherson, Rowley, and Baxter in the official record to screen Grant from any possible mistake he might have made in judgment. That a mistake was made is obvious, but by who?

From the testimony, both after the war and in the official records, it is clear that the words and tone of both Baxter and Rowley in the official record are tainted and false. That Wallace could have gotten lost in an area he would have known well by that time is preposterous. That he was slow is another matter and up for interpretation. By accounts of his subordinates, both shortly after the battle and after the war attest to the rigorous march the division had to execute on April 6^th and the poor quality of the River Road that they ultimately had to traverse to arrive at Pittsburg Landing. That they also executed a forced march of some tens of miles due to the countermarch is also clear, adding time to their arrival. Rowley and Baxter paint a picture of incompetence on Wallace and heroism to themselves, especially Rowley.

What is often overlooked is Grant's mental and physical state at the time of the battle, something that would have come into play upon him during those momentous events. As W.E. Woodward stresses in his biography, Grant was still smarting from his rebuke by his superior Halleck and from his fall a few days before. It is not hard to imagine, given Grant's spotty command history to this point that he misjudged the weight of the Confederate forces bearing upon him and the problems his own divisions were having in containing the assault. It is not hard, further, to imagine that he did indeed order Wallace to join with Sherman's left by the Purdy Road where his forces could best be employed where the crises was most acute. However, knowing the state of the roads connecting the two camps Grant should have known that Wallace's division was at least several hours from entering the fight. His impatience at Wallace's tardiness is further murk to cloud the evidence as he expected Wallace to arrive sooner than either the Purdy Road route or the River Road route would have allowed. Wallace was neither the rank armature nor tactical genius, by all accounts he was competent to do his duty and proved such at the battle of Monocacy later in the war, leading one to the conclusion that he was neither the hero or the goat of Shiloh.

The conclusion to draw from all of this is that Wallace was the victim of the circumstances of where he was at the time of the battle and a mistake made by Grant, in either word or inference, to cause the order to be worded and written down to communicate to Wallace Grant's intentions for the 3^rd Division. That something was communicated to Wallace that lead him, either by direct order or by inference, to join the left of Sherman's division is also clear despite the official testimony of Grant's staff. Wallace was talked out of an official court of inquiry by Sherman and others, an act that would probably have exonerated him and done damage to Grant, especially given his shaky relationship with Halleck. If true, in some senses, Wallace may have been the needed scapegoat that allowed Grant to eventually lead the Union to victory later in the war.

24th Ohio at Shiloh, Army of the Ohio

Along a narrow and lonely path stand the monuments representing Amman's brigade in their positions before they attacked the line thrown together by General Cleburne atop the hill cut by the Hamburg-Purdy road. The forest has been allowed to grow over this part of the battlefield and it gives the whole area an enclosed feeling, claustrophobic and on this day in particular, damp from a recent downpour. The 24^th Ohio, part of Buell's Army of the Ohio, stepped lively across an undulating terrain to charge into the maw of artillery and Confederate musketry to push Cleburne's line even further to the rear.

The character Philip, from my novel They Met at Shiloh, stood in a brigade line that stretched three hundred yards long, marked today by a trail cut in the trees with monument after monument marking the approximate middle of each regimental line. It is sad to see these monuments being over grown by the forest, no longer facing the enemy but now facing loneliness. I only happened upon the trail by accident while searching around the Bloody Pond area, a small marker, across the Hamburg-Savannah road, marks the extreme right of Ammen's brigade line, whose flank most regiment would have been a stones throw away from the Bloody Pond to witness the misery of its denizens. Down the trail I ran into regiment after regiment of Ammen's line until finally finding the monument I was looking for. I wanted to see where each regiment from my novel stood and what the ground looked like.

Of all of the civil war battlefields Shiloh is the one I've been to the most, having visited when I was very young with vague impressions of it still lingering after 25 years, then again at the soggy 135^th reenactment, and finally last summer to get landmark and geographic impressions for the novel. Shiloh is not like Gettysburg, where the field is much like it was 145 years ago where one can stand atop Missionary Ridge or Cemetery Ridge and look out at the same rolling countryside that the combatants did. Shiloh has been allowed to over grow parts of the battlefield forcing you to rely upon the descriptions of the combatants themselves to understand what it was like. Many areas now are thickly wooded and though some of the fields are still present, like Seay and Fraley Field are preserved, some of the other avenues are impassable. Chickamauga, another thickly wooded area is probably better preserved as far as forest management goes. One can take the descriptions of the fight at the Viniard Farm and imagine standing at the tree line along with the soldiers of Wilder's brigade and look down into the famed ditch or from Winfrey Field and see the treeline where the Confederates attacked at dusk.

The Shiloh of yesteryear was forested, but southern farming techniques and general occupation of the land meant that the tree cover was sparse and the farmers only cleared areas for planting, leaving the periphery open for trees to grow unmolested. The results were just like any forest area butting up against settlement, old and tall trees and undergrowth that was minimal due to grazing. It is a pity that the campsites and some of the interior fields of the battleground are now mere clearings in the trees, leaving little to the imagination as to how it looked then. Thankfully, we can still walk those grounds and stand where fallen patriots stood and read the markers that attempt to describe a mere fraction of what happened in each spot. There is a power to those fields yet, of ringing cheers and acrid gun powder whose voice is fading away with time and memory. You can feel you are a part of it for a moment in the stillness and lean upon a gun line marked by surplus cannon. This is what is experienced at Ruggle's gun line facing the Sunken Road. You see it from the campsite of the 25^th Missouri Vols who met the onrush of Confederates early on the morning of April 6^th. You hear it in the groans of the wounded crowded around the Bloody Pond. You feel it in the fear struck crowds of fugitives under the bluff at Pittsuburg Landing.

Lew Wallace and his defenders

When reading either the official records of the war or the correspondences sent to Grant by Wallace from his former subordinates at the time of Shiloh, one thing becomes clear. Both men and their surrogates were trying to preserve a reputation. Grant had those involved submit official reports to the War Department regarding their actions in the Wallace affair as has already been noted. Wallace admits that the fateful order, the order delivered by Assistant Quarter Master Baxter without signature, has been lost to history, reconstructed from the memory by he and his defenders.

The reports submitted by Grant's staff officers, submitted days after the battle all state that the orders Grant communicated to Wallace were to march by the river road and join the right of the army at Pittsburg Landing. Further, most paint an unflattering picture of Wallace in his attempt to get his division into the fight. Rowley, Grant's right hand according to W. E. Woodward's Meet General Grant was particularly unflattering in his description of Wallace and his state of mind.

How can these statements be reconciled with the remembrances of Wallace's staff officers who encountered both Baxter and Rowley as they executed their errands? Wallace's own aid de camp, a Captain Ross relates in a letter to Wallace penned in 1868 that not only was the order given verbally to him as he encountered Captain Baxter but also the written order shown to him relating Grant's order to "move forward and join General Sherman's right on the Purdy road" forming his line of battle at right angles with the river. He further states that the shortest route to accomplish this was to take the Purdy road to make a junction with the right of Sherman, a distance of about 5 miles versus the route purported to have been given via the River Road, a distance of about 12 miles. The order was not signed but was inferred to have come from Grant given that it was delivered by a staff officer of the commanding general. Ross also relates that Baxter told him, upon inquiry as to how the battle was going, that the enemy was being driven in at every point. At the point that Rowley overtook Wallace's command with Grant's second order to hurry along and the intelligence that Sherman had been pushed back so that to continue on the current course would have been to march onto the field behind the enemy lines unsupported, the distance to counter march and take the River Road was no less than 12 miles total. Rowley's account states that Wallace's division marched as if under no idea of haste or need for speed, a statement countered by Col. Thayer's AG, a Major Strickland of the 15^th Ohio who relates that the brigades made a rapid march then counter march.

One man is lying. One man is either mistaken in recollection or purposeful in deceit as to the true nature of the incident. A now missing order, conflicting statements given by staff officers who have every reason to defend their benefactor and discredit their antagonist, and a host of years gone by with no living eye witness the mystery of why Wallace's division was absent on that first day will never be resolved with any certainty.

Grant, before Shiloh

By late February, 1862 General Grant was a newly minted Major General without a command. In a foreshadowing of what would happen along the banks of the Tennessee river in April, Grant's tiny command of 27,000 investing Fort Donelson was surprised in an early morning breakout attempt by the bottled up Confederates. Through the incompetence of the Confederate command, the wildly successful smashing of McLernand's division of which the brunt of the attack fell upon, Confederate General Floyd who decided to turn and try to route the next division in line instead of moving his charges down the now open road to Nashville. The brunt of this attack fell upon General Lew Wallace's 3^rd Division.

W.E. Woodward's biography of Grant states that Grant was called by Flag Officer Foote's flagship for a conference owing to being then unable to get about easily due to a wound. This happenstance took Grant away from the scene of the sudden attack by the Confederates, an unfortunate coincidence that would have consequences later. The early morning parley with Foote brings a most uncomfortable consequence for Grant. His visit is hard to account for how much time he spent and why he did not hear the battle raging no more than three miles away on his right. That he did not hear it is attested by other witnesses on board Foote's flagship. What has been questioned is how much time he spent there. The other being why was he not informed of the attack right away. Grant's own staff should have known where he was, but Grant's detractors later said he spent half the day lounging in Foote's state room smoking cigars and drinking. Woodward states that this rumor was indefensible given Foote's high degree of prohibition against any intoxicant on any vessel of his command. Still, the time is unaccounted for and in his official report of the action Wallace states that he did not see Grant until well after 3pm once the Confederate attack upon his division had been stopped.

In the world of military politics and with a commanding officer, Major General Henry W. Halleck, establishing a severe dislike of the ramshackle Grant, it is not too hard to imagine that Wallace's report, which Grant would have eventually seen, did not paint his participation in the battle in too favorable of a light. That Grant did reverse the morning's misfortune notwithstanding, a cloud was hanging over his generalship. If he cast blame upon Wallace is not known, but it was entered into the official record of the battle and Grant himself makes mention of his whereabouts that morning in his own official account of the action but fails to clarify how long he was in conference with Foote. Aside from reports from Lt. Col McPherson, the army's chief engineer, Flag Officer Foote, and General McLernand, Wallace's report is the only one that makes mention of Grant's presence at all on the battlefield.

With the surrender of Fort Donelson on the 16^th, Grant falls afoul of Halleck when he takes a trip to Nashville to confer with Buell whose entrance into the Tennessee state capital crowned an extraordinarily bad month for the Confederacy. Halleck, fed up with his upstart general and feeling somewhat threatened by his sudden rise to national acclaim fires off several complaints to General McClellan, in command at this time of all the military forces for the Union, requesting permission to relieve Grant of command for his unauthorized absence. Short of arresting Grant, Halleck does the next best thing, leaving him dawdling about Donelson with nothing to do and no troops to command. For two weeks Halleck leaves him there to stew until giving him orders to rejoin his command on the banks of the Tennessee at Pittsburg Landing and Crump's Landing. Once there, Grant remains in a funk until the battle.

Woodward's biography draws comparisons from the Grant that we know and love who eventually rose to the highest rank in the US military, a post once held by Washington, and the Grant who commanded the Army of the Tennessee in April, 1862 and states that Grant is off of his game. Establishing his command post eight miles downriver at Savannah and shuttling back and forth every day, Grant does not stay on the field with his army and remains quasi out of touch with the dispositions that General Smith, given command of the army in place of Grant by Halleck, made of the army. A further fall from a horse a few days before the battle leaves him in constant pain and unable to ride a horse for very long. His own statements notwithstanding as to why he tarried in Savannah as long as he did, Grant's behavior during this episode is out of character and suspect. It is easy, then to speculate and imagine that the mystery of the unwritten order to Wallace at Crump's Landing was indeed to join the right flank of Sherman's division and not, as the second order later in the day was, to march by the river road to Pittsburg Landing. Speculation only, as no court of inquiry was convened that would have opened up much more evidence in either support or condemnation of Wallace officially.

He said, he said

General Lew Wallace

General Wallace was faced with a problem. 6 miles as the crow flies from the scene of the morning's surprise attack on Grant's army encamped at Pittsburg Landing and following orders that he states changed their tune mid way through his march.

I've puzzled over this for some time. If the orders that Grant was supposed to have sent to Wallace via Captain Baxter had been logged and, as dictated by Grant, entered into that log, would not the controversy over why Wallace took the Purdy road instead of the more direct road to Pittsburg Landing be over?

In his article, as alluded to in prior posts, General Henry Carrington surmises that due to Grant's swollen and injured ankle, he was more reliant upon his staff officers to send and note his orders given his lack of mobility. In this instance, a verbal order by Grant to Baxter that was written in Baxter's own hand and then delivered to Wallace later that morning. Carrington further surmises that Baxter, given Grant's orders to have Wallace close up with his right, knowing that at this time in the morning the full details of the fight being still foggy, wrote down the order so as to interpret what Grant wanted, i.e. Wallace on the right of the line next to Sherman instead of at Pittsburg Landing.

Wallace further relates in his letter to Grant years later (also alluded to in previous post) that Baxter first verbally then by written order communicated success of Union arms on the right necessitating the need for Wallace to close on Sherman's right flank via a march down the Purdy road. He states:

…Perhaps I should here state that this order was not signed by anyone, but coming as it did through one of the Staff Officers of the Commanding General, could not be questioned. I would also state in this connection, that when I met Captain Baxter first, I asked him how things were going. He replied that Grant was driving the enemy at all points.

We know this to not be the case, as the left of Grant's line, the division of Prentiss was in fact crumbling and only redeemed by a quick consolidation at the sunken road by remnants of Prentiss', WHL Wallace, and Hurlbut's commands. If Baxter really did relate these things, it shows how in the dark Grant and or Baxter really was at that hour, approximately 8 am when Grant dispatched the captain to Wallace. In his official report, Wallace stated thusly:

At 11.30 o'clock the anticipated order arrived, directing me to come up and take position on the right of the army and form my line of battle at a right angle with the river. As it also directed me to leave a force to prevent surprise at Crump's Landing, the Fifty-sixth Ohio and Sixty-eighth Ohio Regiments were detached for that purpose, with one gun from Lieutenant Thurber's battery. Selecting a road that led directly to the right of the lines as they were established around Pittsburg Landing on Sunday morning, my column started immediately, the distance being about 6 miles. The cannonading, distinctly audible, quickened the steps of the men. Snake Creek, difficult of passage at all times, on account of its steep banks and swampy bottoms, ran between me and the point of junction. Short way from it Captain Rowley, from General Grant, and attached to his staff, overtook me. From him I learned that our lines had been beaten back; that the right, to which I was proceeding, was then fighting close to the river, and that the road pursued would take me in the enemy's rear, where, in the unfortunate condition of the battle, my command was in danger of being entirely cut off. It seemed, on his representation, most prudent to carry the column across to what is called the "River road," which, following the windings of the Tennessee bottoms, crossed Snake Creek by a good bridge close to Pittsburg Landing. This movement occasioned a counter-march, which delayed my junction with the main army until a little after night-fall. The information brought me by Captain Rowley was confirmed by Colonel McPherson and Captain Rawlins, also of the general's staff, who came up while I was crossing to the River road. About 1 o'clock at night my brigades and batteries were disposed, forming the extreme right, and ready for battle.

Something must be said, at this point, about battle reports. Each commanding officer was required to give an account of himself to his superior upon any occasion. Indeed, much of the Official Records of the War of Rebellion are full of mundane reports of actions taken or events witnessed. Herein lies a problem. These reports, written after the fact, were occasion for an officer to trump up his own deeds and belittle the deeds of others. We see this in Captain Rowley's report in my last post. Rowley wastes little time in making him to be the hero and Wallace the goat. It is also clear from Wallace's own report that he had little intimation that he was going to be made a scapegoat for the failure of the first day's action.

What is the evidence?

General Lew Wallace, finding himself at the helm of Smith's division in the middle of the conflagration that would become Shiloh, was in the unenviable post of being separated from the rest of the army at Crump's Landing, six miles as the crow files from Pittsburg Landing. Swampy, forested, and cut by a poor circuit of dirt roads made communication overland time consuming. Early fears of the loss of either of the convenient places to land supplies within reach of any move upon Corinth, Mississippi lead to the dispatching of Smith's 6^th Division to three camps around Crump's Landing. In Grant's memoirs, he states he was initially fearful that the confederates might make a move to take Crump's Landing overland and therefore, especially as he wrestled with the object of the confederate attack. He states this as his reason for having Wallace hold his division in readiness to move until he had developed the enemy's intentions.

Grant knew the road network leading to Crump's overland was indirect and communications over it lengthy. Grant's visit to Wallace at Crump's occurred at 8 am, his order to Wallace to move didn't arrive until 11 am over this lousy road network. Three hours was in the balance for Grant, it would take that long for any communication to get to Wallace and take longer for Wallace to get his division to where it was being ordered. In a battle, a moment is too late even when communications are instantaneous. Communications at Shiloh and in any battle of the Civil War was by horse and any communication of orders would have to take into account that whatever goal Grant had in mind for Wallace, it would have to be with the foreknowledge that the battle situation would be different by the time Wallace's division made the field. Was Grant's intention to tuck the 6^th division away at the landing because the course of the battle was unpredictable or, like any field commander, made a judgment based upon the information he had at the time?

In Grant's official report, he states that due to the circuitous route Wallace needed to take, it took him until evening to arrive on the field. It isn't clear if Grant held any ill will towards Wallace regarding his divisions tardiness, but he at least did not communicate any ill feelings in his official report.

Captain John A. Rawlins, an aid de camp of Grant, states that Grant dispatched Captain Baxter to order Wallace from Crump's Landing to move to the right of the line. However, he further states that Wallace refused to comply without a written order and that Grant then dispatched Rawlins with orders for Wallace to march by the river road, crossing snake creek and the bridge over it and end up at the Landing on the right of the line. Rawlins encounters Wallace along the Purdy road and not the River road as he expected and communicated Grant's orders to Wallace who "indignantly" refuted refusing an order written or not. Rawlins further states that Wallace expressed ignorance of the river road and lamely stated that he was on the road his cavalry headed down. He further communicated to Rawlins that as neither he nor anyone on his staff knew of the river road, he would need Rawlins to act as guide.

I find it incredible that Wallace would not have known about this road, having been encamped at Crump's for weeks and in communication with the rest of the army this whole time. Rawlins' statement regarding this seems overly to the point of feeding the idea that Wallace was in a state of poor command. But, the source must be considered here, coming from a close confidant and ardent supporter of Grant throughout the war and his aid de camp, a position given to ones close friends and supporters. More on this in further posts.

General Lew Wallace at Shiloh

On Feburary 29^th, 1868 Lew Wallace penned a letter to Ulysses S. Grant, Wallace's former commander and about to be elected President of the United States. Wallace opens his letter stating that he became aware of Grant's disquiet and disapproval of Wallace's performance at the battle of Shiloh but was counseled to withdraw his request for a court of inquiry, seeking instead to redress in person the smudge to his and his division's honor.

What happened? As the large encampment at Pittsburg Landing was surprised on the morning of April 6^th, 1862 and was in the process of being overrun by Albert Sidney Johnston's Army of Tennessee. Wallace, in temporary command of Grant's 6^th Division in place of an ailing General Smith, was encamped at Crump's Landing five miles as the crow flies from Pittsburg Landing was ordered by Grant personally to prepare to move at 8 am as he (Grant) made his way by paddlewheel up river from his HQ at Savannah. Grant, upon learning of the situation at Pittsuburg Landing sent a Captain Baxter with orders for Wallace's division to begin moving. Here is where the controversy starts. What was the order? By what route to take and by what result to achieve by moving?

Grant, in his memoirs, written after his two terms in office and while dying of throat cancer, had this to say about what his orders where:

Up to that time I had felt by no means certain that Crump's landing might not be the point of attack. On reaching the front, however, about eight A.M., I found that the attack on Pittsburg was unmistakable, and that nothing more than a small guard, to protect our transports and stores, was needed at Crump's. Captain Baxter, a quartermaster on my staff, was accordingly directed to go back and order General Wallace to march immediately to Pittsburg by the road nearest the river. Captain Baxter made a memorandum of this order. (chapter 14, paragraph 10)

Wallace, by virtue of letters in his possession of statements by his former subordinates and by his own statements tells a different tale in his letter to Grant:

…On the contrary, the order I received from your messenger was in writing, unsigned, and contained substantially the following instructions: "You will leave a force at Crump's Landing sufficient to guard the public property there; then march the rest of your division, and effect a junction with the right of the army; after which you will form your line of battle at right angles with the river, and act as circumstances dictate." (Major General Lew Wallace at Shiloh, Bay State Monthly magazine, vol 2 issue 6 1885)

The question becomes, whose memory is correct? Was it the second order, the order Grant dispatched after 1 pm to Wallace - the one that was recorded and signed by him, ordering Wallace to the Landing and not the right of the line? The first order, dispatched in a hurry and not signed and therefore not logged and delivered by Captain Baxter, could it have stated Grant's wish to re-enforce Sherman's pressed division on the right and thus either save it from further retreat or to fall upon the enemy's extended left flank in a coup de main? Wallace collected statements from several of his brigade commanders and those who met personally Captain Baxter as he made his way through the tangle of poor roads leading to Wallace's camps at Crump's.

Of all of the controversies surrounding the battle, this is probably the most well known and the one that is the most reported as Wallace becoming confused or lost on his way to joining the battle. I'll have more on this in further entries.

Working on screenplay

I finished working through my screenplay where I left off at the end of the first act. It took me awhile to figure out what I had been doing those four years ago and where to pick up. I had forgotten that the main plan for the story line came from the book Ten Days to Destiny by Kiriakopoulos, a very in-depth look at the campaign from all sides. The history reads much like a story, and that is more the job of a historian today, telling stories. There are elements to a story that have to be in place before it can succeed and I like the story woven in the history of this battle.

My dilemma is how to treat the Cretan partisans. When we think of resistance movements in WWII we think of the French Underground, or the Dutch, or the Russian, or the Yugoslavs under Tito. But, are they the innocent doves we have been treated to in television and movie? They are innocents compared with the occupying Germans who are the villains in any story. That is not history, at least not complete history. It is public consumption history, trite and lacking in the complexity that is reality.

Our own history vaunts the Minuteman militia companies that met the British at Concord Green. A long tradition of militia service formed our frontiers and acted as a protection from marauding Indians and enemy colonial empires. But, if it were not for the Continental Army would we have won our independence? Our own Civil War had but few examples of disorganized volunteer formations beating formations of regulars, like the battle for Val Verde ford on the Rio Grande in New Mexico. If not for the few regular regiments left in New Mexico and the largely un-reliable New Mexican volunteer formations the Confederate invasion might have been beaten. Yet, there is still a world of difference between a volunteer formation and a militia one.

What is my dilemma? Should the act of sabotage or murder be condoned by merely the target of such activity? Is not terrorism an act perpetrated by irregular formations without legal sanction? Are the Sadrist militia formations in Iraq freedom fighters or terrorists? How about Al Queda? Is there a popular uprising in Iraq or a conflict fueled by adherents to Islam from foreign lands who want to kill American soldiers? Are the resistance movements from WWII on the same par as the Viet Cong? Unfortunately these are not apples to apples comparisons. The French Underground became useful tools to the Allied command, but were they really trusted?

The problem with popular uprisings is they are not affiliated with any ideology save for resistance to the dominating force thrust upon them. They can and did just as easily oppose and become problematic for those they allied themselves with, for the absence of a common enemy can lead to the weapons once supplied being turned upon you. Ho Chi Mhin was once an ally only because we were at war against the Japanese.

The Cretan civilians who fought against the German Fallschirmjaeger and Gebirgsjaeger who took Crete did so out of a long tradition for being independent and ungovernable. Some practiced wonton acts of murder in cold blood against troops who refused to see them as anything other than civilians. This is the problem when factoring in the irregulars who roamed the Cretan hillsides "poaching" at isolated Fallschirmjaeger. Soldiers kill other soldiers, but what is it when a civilian, a non-combatant does it? For our own part, we have called them heroes because they fought the Hun who took their land. But, is it heroism? Sadam's Fedayeen were irregulars, not soldiers paid by their government.

This is going to be the challenge in this script, to depict the Cretan irregulars in a proper but truthful light. I do not want to portray them as angels forced to do it, but as men and women who acted upon their cultural heritage of intransigence. I also have the telling of history to adhere to, for terrorist or freedom fighter history has classified all resistance movements against German or Japanese occupation as such. But, the things happening in Iraq beg the question of activity alone. Are irregulars, no matter who they are fighting, to be treated as combatants or as terrorists?

Book progress

Well, any planning is progress, right?

My wife and I spent some time this last memorial day looking at our plans for publishing the novel. I started out last year working to produce a homeschool curriculum to go along with the novel, believing that it would be the only way I could sell the novel. Being a critic of my own abilities and work, anything to enhance the marketability of the novel was gold in my book. But, as my wife and I have researched further into the homeschool market, fewer families are homeschooling past the junior high and high school ages, exactly the age group I was targeting.

What plans now? The owner of Gravitas Publications, a good friend and advisor to our own project gave us some good advice: get the novel edited and published first. The novel has been complete now for half a year, but the funds to get it professionally edited have been lacking. We have the money now, but I'm having second thoughts. Self publishing has been what we've wanted to do for many reasons, the biggest being more control over all of everything. But, is that enough? Another friend, owner of Precise Edit has given us a quote for the editing, but now that money is involved and a decision to make I find that I am pausing. We know that we want to have a professional edit done, but we now have to sink or swim based upon this choice.

But, my passion for history and to communicate it clearly has always lead me to research and read as much history as I can lay my hands on. I found that I was languishing a bit creatively as I tried to force writing more essays for the workbook into my schedule, essays that I've lacked passion for completing. The end result? I'm spending my weekends working on this blog and completing another project I lay aside to complete the novel, a screen play set in the battle for Crete in WWII and working on the workbook without a deadline hanging over my head.

Shiloh, that battle that has for a long time engaged my imagination and occupied so much research still lays before me, in maps, in books, and in notes that are so old now that the original ruled lines on the loose leafed pages have faded away. Notes on characters that have been abandoned and notes on regiments no longer utilized in the storyline. The battle lives on, thanks to reenacting and the NPS parks that preserve them. It lives on in history books and memoirs, newspaper and magazine articles. It lives on in my characters and my soggy memories of the 135^th Shiloh reenactment in Tennessee that seemed doomed from the start. Hopefully, it will also live on in this blog.

They Met at Shiloh

In 1987 I began researching for a novel I wanted to write about the civil war battle of Shiloh. I'd always been interested in this battle. It was like two different battles on two consecutive days. So went the dramatic turn of events that allowed Grant to salvage a defeat and turn it into a victory thanks to the arrival of Buell's Army of the Ohio and the death of the Army of Mississippi's commander, Albert Sidney Johnston early the first day. It had controversy, legend, sublime and poignant scenes and a casualty list that shocked the country.

I began formulating the story and amassing research but by my graduation from college in 1992 I'd only finished half of it. Too many characters and not enough experience in writing this sort of thing had me drift away from the work to other pursuits of finding a job and getting married. I kept the project in the back of my mind, however. By 1995 I found a local civil war unit and became a federal reenactor, adding to my knowledge of the civil war research on such mundane things as camp life, organization, battlefield tactics, and how a soldier carried himself while on campaign. I soon joined one of the early hardcore battalions, the Army of the Pacific and enjoyed many a time with these dedicated reenactors who taught me how to dig deep and portray a man of war in the Union army. Reenacting most of all helped prepare me for renewing my vision for finishing the novel, adding another dimension that I never would have been able to include had I not first been a reenactor.

Though the research allowed me to envision what it was that the ordinary soldier reported seeing and how he dealt with the horrors of combat, the living historian angle allowed me to catch glimpses I never would have found had my knowledge only been two dimensional. Armed then with experience in the field and more research I picked up my novel once again in 2000 and re-wrote it from the beginning, trimming down the characters, developing the story, and honing my vision for the final product.

I wanted to write something that did not attempt to compete with the histories that have already been written about the battle by historians more talented than I. I wanted to write something from the common soldier's perspective to reveal the rich nature of camp life and interaction between ones pards.

With this as a start, I'd like to over the next week delve into the debate about what happened with Lew Wallace's division encamped at Crump's Landing, a mere five miles away as the crow flies from Pittsburg Landing and why this has, to this day even, puzzled historians and enthusiasts alike.

I know it has been several years since I've last posted on this blog. When I started it, I was just exploring the world of blogging and ran several in tandem but soon discovered how much work they were. At the time I was very busy with drama in my church ministry and at work and I struggled to find my voice.

I have since finished my fictional history novel on Shiloh and as my wife and I explore our avenues of publishing and bringing my passion for teaching people our rich heritage of history, free from as much political correctness and politics in general, I am endeavoring to begin this journey anew. Writing and researching the workbook curriculum to accompany my novel has renewed my love for research and teaching. There is a rich history of military and political questions to be explored regarding the Civil War battle of Shiloh and I've just begun to scratch the surface of what is out there.

This was formerly harder to accomplish as most of these treasure troves of personal correspondence and newspaper, magazine, and journal writings were sitting in thousands of archives scattered about the US. With the internet and the improvements in OCR scanning technology many of these writings are available for easy access and perusal. I've begun searching for articles written by the participants as I uncover controversy and questions of interpretation that are relevant in our current day.

In the coming weeks I'll be writing on some of these things and hopefully starting a dialogue with other historians and Civil War enthusiasts in hopes of creating awareness of Shiloh and talking about my journey in writing about Shiloh.

A touch of Middle Eastern history

I read Debkafile just about every day, they are an Israeli team of journalists with pretty high intelligence connections and always have a bird's eye view of what is happening in this area of the world.

I won't comment much on this piece, but to say that although I support our efforts in Iraq to build up a stronger, and might I add friendly aligned country with our interests, Iraq the "democratization of the country" is more than likely doomed to fail, it is a Westerner's concept and not at all keeping with the history of this part of the world where ones family lineage speaks more to the individual than what we understand ourselves.

Hashemite Dynasty Shows the Flag at Gulf of Aqaba

What is the most telling is the need for symbol and of rights of inheritance that are still felt by the principle parties involved and why they motivate so much. They obviously motivate the Al Queda adherent to sacrifice themselves for their ideal. I suppose Democracy and our ideal of freedom motivates our soldiery to keep their faces towards the enemy and apply courage as the insurgency begins to dwindle down.

Outrageous!

I picked this up from Obnoxiousfumes.com who in turn found it mentioned on another blog.

Hardball with Chris Matthews, Oct 18

I won't pull any captions out of context and leave the reading you to, but as a historian I'm appalled at the lack of restraint exhibited by our former President here. Surely a student of the Revolutionary War would be able to make intelligent comparison and proper analogy when comparing one war and time period to another. But, I suppose the exigencies of politics and dogma win out in any struggle for the pursuit of truth.

I will take a few of the statements made and correct them, for if you watched this interview I hope you at least scratched your head and said, "that just don't sound right". If you didn't, if you nodded your head up and down and lapped up the astounding statements made and accepted them as truth, then I will have to say your understanding of American history (let alone world history) is very shallow.

I will say this, however, Carter was not on Hardball because he was a historian, otherwise one would hope his statements would have been more accurate and his use of history not so mind boggling inaccurate.

Carters statement about the British being misled is wrong on so many levels. It presumes that the British, as a people, had a choice in what the Crown chose to do or not to do, as if the Brit of the revolution was just like the Brit of today. I have to believe that Carter knows the score here, who but only the most bored and dense grade schooler doesn't know that England was ruled by a monarch, a king, a man who held sole power to lead the direction of the country. But that wasn't his point; he used a poor analogy to make his political point. We were a colony, Mr. Former President, a colony in rebellion. We were still not much different from the people “across the pond”, we had not "evolved" egregiously from the people we would then be fighting against.

Carter then launches into our war in Iraq in an attempt to liken it to the British fighting the British in our own war. Ok, not only are the figures of civilian casualties thrown out and increased for effect (there were civilian casualties, but tens of thousands? I've followed the war and I've followed our occupation and unless my mental calculator is broken, I'm sure I would remember 30 to 50 thousand civilian dead). Then he likens our presence in Iraq to the enforcers of a foreign concept of rule. The British where not present in the colonies to enforce a foreign concept, they were holding on to what was being ripped from them.

Now, I don't know what histories Matthews has been reading, but he attempts to lay "democratization of other societies" upon President Bush as if Bush is the sole inventor of this program. The Philippines and Cuba come to mind from our earlier actions since before Bush was ever alive!

Then finally begins the descriptions of the Revolutionary War and another twist in revisionist history, nationalism. It isn't too hard to see where Matthews and Carter are leading to in this pseudo discussion couched in our own history. Not only is this attempt to link the "minutemen" of our own Revolution to the insurgency in Iraq but also a queer maligning of our own "patriotism". Iraqi insurgents: Sadrists - those followers of Mohammed Sadr in his bid to force his way into Iraqi politics and the foreign Al Queda fighters.

Now, a myth which is being further promulgated here is the militia. Every township had a militia; it was for Indian defense and local protection. The militia met when called upon or on a schedule. They were called upon to augment regular forces and saw service off and on during the French and Indian Wars and the Revolution. The militia’s finest hour, Lexington green. Militia companies formed and met and harassed the British regular forces and won the war! No, they dispersed and the British went where they willed. Although used throughout the war to augment, they never filled the role that history and our mythos has given them. Did they answer the call? Mostly, when it suited their needs and they could be drawn away from home. It was the Continental Regulars who stood the test and fought the type of warfare the British were used to. It was they who stood the eventually won us the war, with the final intervention of the French. Carter made sure to put this in, in a snotty sort of way no doubt. French ships and troops arrived just in time for us to deliver the final blow to the British. Let's not get all foggy eyed and sing our favorite French ditty. France intervened for one reason: when we were winning and to deal with their arch nemesis on the European continent, Britain. It would be four long years of struggle before any French troops set foot on our soil.

Carter's last statement caps the "let's embrace the French" and prove to the world that we owe them our country. The French showed up after Washington had already pushed Cornwallis into the fortifications of Yorktown. The French were there for the knockout blow and cannot be slighted for that. But to infer that the French were all that stood in the way of our independence or continuance of being a British colony, I'm sorry but the record does not support the role Carter and Matthews wish to give the French, another Monarchy bent on hegemony in Europe at the time.

Dred Scott vs. Sanford and Roe vs. Wade

I ran across this at History in the News
with a further link to The Wichita Eagle
about President Bush's reference in the last debate
regarding the comparison between Dred Scott vs Sandord
and the Roe vs. Wade Supreme Court decisions.

I didn't watch the debates so cannot comment directly
on what the President meant, may have meant, or so
forth. What I'm sure is being lost on many as they
scramble to spin this, is the unilateral decision
making power of the Supreme Court justices to effect
all Americans without process of legislation.

Dred Scott was a slave whose master had transported
him and his family through a free state to another
slave state. Dred Scott then contended that due to
having passed through free soil, he was then entitled
to be free himself as well as his family. He then
brought suit against his master for his freedom.

The Supreme court overturned a lower court decision
that Scott could not sue for his freedom as he was not
a citizen of the state of Missouri and could not bring
suit against his master with the following statements:

10. The plaintiff having admitted, by his demurrer to the plea in abatement, that his ancestors were imported from Africa and sold as slaves, he is not a citizen of the State of Missouri according to the Constitution of the United States, and was not entitled to sue in that character in the Circuit Court.
11. This being the case, the judgment of the court below, in favor of the plaintiff on the plea in abatement, was erroneous.

Contrary to the myth that this case was decided based
upon the "slave as property" but was in fact one of
the symantecs of what a citizen is and who can bring
suit in a court. That this had the overall meaning and
definition in history cannot be denied and the case as
a whole did become a further turning point in the
eventual abolishment of slavery in the US.

Unfortunatly, it would seem that the analogy was a
poor one when compared with Roe v. Wade. Whereas the
Supreme court then sided with the rights of the states
to define thier own citizenry based upon status (if
for example Missouri had on thier books the following
law: a person of African decent who is born into
slavery will be considered a slave until such time as
they have been freed by thier master but will not be
considered a citizen of the state of Missouri ...). In
the latter Supreme Court decision the rights of the
states to have laws making abortion ilegal were struck
down.

So, in one sense the Supreme Court Justices held to a
strict application of the constitution in regards to
the definition of citizenship as relating to the laws
of the states and what the constitution provided for
who could be counted as a citizen of those states:

4. A free negro of the African race, whose ancestors were brought to this country and sold as slaves, is not a 'citizen' within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States.
5. When the Constitution was adopted, they were not regarded in any of the States as members of the community which constituted the State, and were not numbered among its 'people or citizens.' Consequently, the special rights and immunities guarantied to citizens do not apply to them. And not being 'citizens' within the meaning of the Constitution, they are not entitled to sue in that character in a court of the United States, and the Circuit Court has not jurisdiction in such a suit.

Whereas in our latter case the rights of the states
were usurped by the court in the rights to make laws
governing thier citizenry in relation to abortion,
thus as some have argued, passed law from the bench
beholden to no one.

Part II of Star Treck Enterprise: Storm Front

Actor J. Paul Boehmer in the Star Treck Enterprise season opener, part II as a Waffen SS officer. Star Treck Enterprise: Storm Front
Posted by Hello

The final part of the Enterprise season opener aired this last Friday evening and it was overall a decent episode. The writers of the series have taken pains to make the latest captain a bit rougher and grity as compared to the other characters in the successful franchise.

I won't go into the details on the episode, that can be watched and read from the web site or on TV when it is re-aired. What I wanted to comment on was thier always deft treatment of history and in this instance with cause and effect.

It is discovered that someone (a temporal agent) has altered history by assasinating Lenin in 1916. Lennin has been in exile in Switzerland since Tzarist Russia had him expelled for his agitation and political sedition. He is all but quiet however in his exile and has planned a return to Russia when the timing becomes right. He doesn't make it, however, and the communist revolution that Lennin will start never happens. According to this episode, since there was no Bolshlevick Russia to oppose his own National Socialist revolution in Germany, Hitler does not see the east as a threat and as he start war in 1939 he can do so without that threat to his back door. Hitler then is enabled to conquer the west with impunity and take Britain out as well before turning to the United States and to Russia.

Interesting process of cause and effect that does lend itself to creative "what if" scenarios. Without a communist Russia under a Stalin, what would Europe look like today? Quite different I would imagine in both geo-political borders and overall mind set.

Although, with any cause and effect scenario, one can never quite escape the overall fabric of history and must then go even further back in order to describe a valid "what if".

All sci-fi aside, the most pain ful Star Treck episodes to watch have been thier "historical" ones. It is too easy to sacrifice truth and realisim for artistic message and image. The Waffen SS soldiers (elites in the German Army whose prowess on the battlefield earned them both notoriety and respect from all sides of the war) were bumbling idiots as envisioned by the series writers and director.

But, I digress!

Unfortunatly, the nuance of the "Lennin gambit" let's call it isn't as clean as one might think. In 1916 the second year of the stalemate war was in full gear with both the British and French preparing the next big "breakthrough" offensives and the Germans were merely "holding the line" in the west while contending with the Russians in the East and spreading thier resources thinner in other parts of the world to prop up thier allies in the Balkans.

In actuality, a Russia without Lennin would have spelled a prolonging of the "Great War" by keeping Germany's forces spread between two fronts and keeping Austria-Hungry in the war. When the Commintern sued for a seperate peace with Germany, thus taking Russia out of the war, the Imperial War staff of Ludendorf and Hindenberg where brought from the East and allowed a breadth of control over German war strategy that had hitherto been only in the person of the Kiaser himself. The disasterous German spring offensives in 1918 drained thier manpower then in turn lead to a collapse of the western front in the face of the renewed allied offensives in the summer/fall of 1918.

The Lennin gambit lays quite a bit upon the conflict of National Socialisim against Bochlivisim as a guiding factor in WWII. It is no doubt that Hitler cast envious eyes upon the Serf's under Communist rule but it lays too much upon this one singular point of Hitler's war aspirations. It also leaves quite a lot unanswered from the first war.

Qoutes

I found another interesting set of quotes, one duringthe First World War as it pertained to Iraq and onefrom President Bush at the end of Operation IraqiFreedom. It will be noted, the first quote references thecampaign where a British force liberated what is nowIsrael and forced the Turkish army to abandon Iraq. Asan ally of Germany and posing a threat to Britishcommerce via the Dardanelles, Britain had fought acostly and ineffectual battle on the Gallipolipeninsula in 1915 against the Turks and had shiftedthe area of operations to the Egyptian theater. Illsupported and out generall'ed, the Turks and Germansretreated.

****
British General F. S. Maude to the people ofMesopotamia, March 19, 1917, as
quoted by NiallFerguson in "Hegemony or Empire," Foreign Affairs(September
2003):
Our armies do not come into your cities and lands asconquerors or enemies, but as liberators. ... It is[not] the wish of [our] government to impose upon youalien institutions. ... [It is our wish] that youshould prosper even as in the past, when your landswere fertile, when your ancestors gave to the worldliterature, science, and art, and when Baghdad citywas one of the wonders
of the world. ... It is [our]hope that the aspirations of your philosophers and writers shall be realized and that once again thepeople of Baghdad shall flourish, enjoying theirwealth and substance under institutions which are inconsonance with their sacred laws and their racialideals.

George Bush, April 4, 2003:
The government of Iraq, and the future of yourcountry, will soon belong to you. ... We will end abrutal regime ... so that Iraqis can live in security.We will respect your great religious traditions, whoseprinciples of equality and compassion are essential toIraq's future. We will help you build a peaceful andrepresentative government that protects the rights ofall citizens.
And then our military forces will leave.Iraq will go forward as a unified, independent, andsovereign nation that has regained a respected placein the world. You are a good and gifted people -- theheirs of a great civilization that contributes to all humanity.

****

I won't pretend to know the greater strategic goals ofthe campaign in Iraq nor of the greater consequencesdown the road.